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The Chief obstacle in the resolution of historical injustices in international law is the 
inter-temporal question, summarized as the requirement that positive substantive 
international law, as it stood at the time in which an injustice occurred, ought always to 
apply over latter laws. Jus cogens, being largely independent from positive international 
law, offers a possible resolution to this problem: a possibility that this thesis explores 
using Mau Mau torture claims as a case study.  
 
Present in much legal opinion on the question is a presumption that inter-temporal law 
applies unless state practice justifying an exception for jus cogens can be found. 
However, this necessarily subjects jus cogens to inter-temporality and contradicts the 
standard meaning of jus cogens and its superior status in the entire legal framework of 
international law. It is argued in this paper that the superiority of jus cogens in 
international law should be reflected in the application of the inter-temporal principle, as 
indeed it should in the application of all other inferior norms and principles wherever 
relevant subject matter is in issue. 
 
After the introduction in chapter one, the above-described problem in the scholarly 
approach to inter-temporal law and jus cogens is highlighted in chapters two and three, 
wherein an apparent normative conflict between jus cogens and inter-temporal law is 
demonstrated. But if jus cogens norms begin at an identifiable point in time and are 
prospective in nature, no over-lap and thus no contradiction can be spoken of where the 
matter occurred before the emergence of these norms, a problem tackled in chapter four. 
Difficulties in the standard definition of jus cogens found in article 53 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties are also discussed along with an argument for an 
unlimited temporal scope of application for ‘humanitarian’ peremptory norms. Lastly, 
chapter five approaches the problem through the prism of a balancing scale of competing 
interests. In short, this thesis argues that there is no threat to justice, law or truth in 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
I. Background: Mau Mau claims, torture and international law 
 
a) Mau Mau claims 
 
The Mau Mau claims of torture at the hands of British colonial officers in colonial Kenya 
during the so-called emergency period (20th October, 1952 to 12th January, 19601) have 
been the subject of two separate legal actions in recent years. The first one succeeded at 
the preliminary stages of the trial2 but never went to full hearing. Instead, an out-of-court 
settlement was made with the British government on behalf of 5,228 claimants.3 This 
settlement consisted of an acknowledgment by the government of Great Britain that acts 
of torture and gross violations of the claimants’ human rights occurred during the 
emergency period, an expression of regret (but no formal apology, nor admission of 
liability) and a rather small sum of money paid in compensation.4 
 
Unsatisfied with the outcome of the first suit and perhaps buoyed by its success at the 
preliminary stages in the High Court in London, seven British firms have recently lodged 
a fresh suit in the London High Court in October, 2014,5 this time representing over 
40,000 claimants. The suit concerns a variety of acts constituting human rights violations 
including: torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment, forced labor and even the 
denial of the right to education. These are alleged to have been perpetrated on the 
                                                          
1 David A, 2005, Histories of the Hanged: The Dirty War in Kenya and the End of Empire at 390, 
393.  
2 Ndiki Mutua & others -v- The Foreign and Commonwealth[2011] EWHC 1913 (QB); and Ndiki 
Mutua & others -v- The Foreign and Commonwealth Office [2012] EWHC 2678 (QB) Case No: 
HQ09X02666 High Court (Queen’s Bench Division) 5 October 2012.  
3 Statement to Parliament on settlement of Mau Mau claims by Foreign Secretary, The Rt. Hon. 
William Hague MP, Parliamentary Debates (Commons) 6th June, 2013. 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/statement-to-parliament-on-settlement-of-mau-mau-claims 
4 £I9.9 million for all 5, 228 claimants amounted to about £3,800 per claimant. 




claimants in the emergency period.6 However, it is torture that this paper focusses on, 




Caroline Elkins summarizes the acts of torture that occurred in Kenya in the early 1950s 
thus, 
 
“Electric shock was widely used, as well as cigarettes and fire. Bottles (often 
broken), gun barrels, knives, snakes, vermin, and hot eggs were thrust up 
men's rectums and women's vaginas. The screening teams whipped, shot, 
burned and mutilated Mau Mau suspects, ostensibly to gather intelligence for 
military operations and as court evidence.”7 
 
And from Malcolm Coxall,  
 
“A number of male victims suffered from castration, women suffered from 
horrendous sexual abuse, many thousands of Mau Mau members were beaten, 
tortured and killed.”8 
 
Indeed, the Mau Mau torture claims have the strange “advantage” of constituting acts so 
horrendous that they cannot reasonably fail to meet the threshold of acts considered to be 
torture.  According to Michael J. Garcia’s report to the United States Congress on torture, 
the meaning of “torture” in the Convention against Torture (CAT)9 includes more than 
poor treatment while in the custody of governmental officers.10 The acts must go beyond 
“rough treatment” that amounts only to police brutality, which, “while deplorable, does 
                                                          
6 Ibid. 
7 Elkins, C (2005) Imperial Reckoning: The Untold Story of Britain's Gulag in Kenya, at 66. 
8 Coxall, M (2013) Human Manipulation - A Handbook, para 12.2. 
9 UN General Assembly, Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, 10 December 1984, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1465, p. 85. 
10 Garcia MJ, U. N. Convention against Torture (CAT): Overview and Application to 
Interrogation Techniques, for U.S. Library of Congress, CRS Report RL32438 (Washington, DC: 
Office of Congressional Information and Publishing, January 26, 2009), at 2. 
3 
 
not amount to torture for purposes of the Convention”.11 Torture is thus understood as 
involving extreme actions, including “systematic beating, electric shock applied to 
sensitive parts of the body, and tying up or hanging in positions that cause extreme 
pain.”12 The fact that CAT’s article 16 requires states to abstain from “inhuman or cruel 
acts that do not amount to torture” is also taken as proof for the position that not all 
inhuman treatment automatically qualifies as torture: These are listed separately from 
torture in the convention and prohibited in their own terms.13 
 
Certainly, the acts described by Elkins and Coxall above go beyond mere “rough 
treatment.” Indeed, while the threshold for torture is still a matter of debate in 
international law, no one could seriously doubt that the acts allegedly perpetrated on Mau 
Mau detainees qualify. Moreover, the facts were generally admitted by the British 
Government through its Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), though liability for 
them in British Municipal law and International law is adamantly denied.  
 
The Mau Mau claims also have the “advantage” that they occurred relatively recently. 
Many of the victims or their immediate relations are still alive.  Thus, the claims escape 
the problem of linking present injury to past injustices that in many ways seriously 
hinders reparations claims based on historical injustices—usually from both a legal and 
moral stand-point.  In fact, the events of the Mau Mau claims happened in the early part 
of the ‘human rights era’ shortly after the end of the Second World War, when 
instruments of foundational importance in Human Rights Law were drafted and adopted, 
namely: the UN Charter (1945),14 The Genocide Convention (1948),15 The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (1948),16 The Geneva Conventions (1949)17 and The 
European Convention on Human Rights (1950).18 
                                                          
11 Ibid, citing President Reagan’s address to the U.S. Senate on debates regarding American 
ratification of the Convention. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid. 
14 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI. 
15 UN General Assembly, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, 9 December 1948, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 78, p. 277. 




c) Torture in modern and past international law 
 
Regardless of the above “strengths” of the Mau Mau claims, they share the common 
handicap of claims based on historical injustices in that they occurred before the law on 
torture had developed into a clearly recognizable and universally binding prohibition of 
the abuses that the victims suffered. In fact, when the worst of the atrocities took place 
(the period between October, 1952 and June, 195319) there were only two international 
treaties that had explicit provisions against torture: the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 
European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR). Regrettably, the ECHR would only 
come into force on 3rd September, 1953, while Britain ratified the Geneva Conventions in 
1957, well after the atrocities. 
 
The prohibition of torture had become a universally binding norm of international law at 
least by Filartiga vs Pena- Irala (1980)20 when the American Appeals Court declared 
that: 
 
“….official torture is now prohibited by the law of nations. The prohibition is 
clear and unambiguous, and admits of no distinction between treatment of 
aliens and citizens.”21 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
17 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of 
the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (First Geneva Convention), 
12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 31; International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Geneva 
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of 
Armed Forces at Sea (Second Geneva Convention), 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 85; International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners 
of War (Third Geneva Convention), 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 135; International Committee of 
the Red Cross (ICRC), Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time 
of War (Fourth Geneva Convention), 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 287. 
18 Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, as amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, 4 November 1950, ETS 5. 
19 Bennett, H (2012) Fighting the Mau Mau: The British Army and Counter-Insurgency in the 
Kenya Emergency, Cambridge University Press, 81. 




This prohibition was explicitly stated in several international instruments of widespread 
application22 and in the municipal laws of 55 nations.23 Conversely, laws permitting 
governments to employ torture as a device in investigations and other situations had 
disappeared from virtually all the municipal systems that had previously had them.24 
Moreover, there was overwhelming evidence of the near universal opinio juris of states 
regarding this rule in their public statements.25 While it was beyond dispute that many of 
these same states regularly employed the use of torture in practice, none of them publicly 
admitted to it or defended the practice.26 This latter “practice”, therefore, despite its fairly 
extensive application, was to be construed as a violation of the norm rather than as 
evidence of a custom permitting governments to practice torture.27 
 
However, the situation in the 1950s was quite different. As seen in the reference to the 
late coming-into-force of the1949 Geneva Conventions and the ECHR above, the UDHR 
was the only “operative” instrument that clearly prohibited torture during the time of the 
Mau Mau tortures. It declared,  
 
“No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment.”28 
 
By itself, however, the declaration could not be considered binding until it had been 
“gradually justified by state practice.”29 In fact, Bennett notes that this confirming 
practice did not exist during the emergency period.30 Thus, international customary law 
could not have been relied upon at the time to claim a breach of international law, either.   
 
                                                          
22 CAT; UDHR (article 3 ); Geneva Conventions (Common article 3); ECHR (article 5); UN 
General Assembly, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 
1966, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 999, p. 171 (article  7) (ICCPR). 





28 UDHR, article 3. 
29 Filartiga case. 
30 Bennett, at 77. 
6 
 
Common article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions in its turn protects  
 
“persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed 
forces who have laid down their arms and those placed 'hors de combat' by 
sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause.”31 
 
These persons must always be treated “humanely”.32 The article further prohibits such 
acts as: “violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel 
treatment and torture,”33 as well as “outrages upon personal dignity, in particular 
humiliating and degrading treatment.”34 In addition, it requires that the wounded and sick 
“be collected and cared for.”35 
 
Clearly, the kinds of acts perpetrated against Mau Mau suspects and prisoners would’ve 
been prohibited by the language of common article 3. Unfortunately, as indicated above, 
the Geneva Conventions came into force for Britain rather late. It also appears that the 
Geneva Conventions would not have afforded much legal protection to the Mau Mau 
anyway, as a wide consensus among experts has concluded that it is extremely difficult to 
establish with any confidence that the Mau Mau rebellion amounted to an “armed 
conflict” that would have triggered the application of Common Article 3.36 Similarly 
unfortunately, the European Convention whose article 5 also prohibits torture suffers the 
same disabilities as the Geneva Conventions as far as the Mau Mau cases are concerned.  
 
But might other aspects of the law offer relief from these temporal difficulties?  
 
 “Objects and purposes” of treaties 
 
The VCLT provides,  
                                                          
31 Geneva Conventions, Common Article 3 (1) 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid, article 3 (1) (a). 
34 Ibid, article 3 (1) (c). 
35 Ibid, article 3 (2). 




“A State is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and 
purpose of a treaty when:  (a) it has signed the treaty or has exchanged 
instruments constituting the treaty subject to ratification, acceptance or 
approval, until it shall have made its intention clear not to become a party to 
the treaty; or  (b) it has expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty, 
pending the entry into force of the treaty and provided that such entry into 
force is not unduly delayed.”37 
 
Thus, the question must be asked if by virtue of this principle, the obligations of the 
above-discussed conventions would apply to the Mau Mau tortures despite their late entry 
into force. In fact, the VCLT itself, adopted much later than any of these conventions, is 
not retroactive in application.38 However, might it reflect a rule of customary 
international law relevant to the 1950s? Bennett appears to think so.39 According to him, 
this rule of custom obliges the state party to act “in the spirit” of a convention after 
becoming signatory thereto.40 He explains regarding the Geneva Conventions in 
particular, that “the spirit” of these Conventions excludes Common Article 3—the only 
protection for victims of non-international armed conflicts in the Geneva Conventions. 
For him, “the spirit’ of this convention is the regulation of inter-state conflict, to which 
common article 3 has no application.41  
 
However, the ICTR trial chamber said in The Prosecutor vs Akayesu, 
 
                                                          
37 United Nations, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, United Nations, 
Treaty Series, vol. 1155, p. 331, article 18. 
38 Ibid, article 4. 





“The four Geneva Conventions – as well as the two Additional Protocols – as 
stated above, were adopted primarily to protect the victims as well as 
potential victims of armed conflicts.”42 
 
It seems that the aims of common article 3 accord perfectly with the general aims of the 
Geneva Conventions as a whole. In fact, when it comes to human rights and humanitarian 
instruments in general, just where “the spirit” ends and the explicit obligation begins 
seems an impossible distinction to make.  The object of the ECHR, for example, is no 
more nor less than to protect and insure human rights.43 It does not seem possible to argue 
that violations of basic human rights such as were committed by British colonial officers 
could possibly accord to the spirit of a Human rights treaty that forbids torture, however 
one may construe that “spirit.” To the contrary, it seems fair to conclude that Britain’s 
duty to act “in the spirit” of the European and Geneva Conventions (were the Geneva 
Conventions applicable) no doubt would have included a duty to refrain from committing 
such acts as Mau Mau detainees were subjected to.  
 
However, Hollis says that the extent to which the above-referenced article 18 reflects 
customary law is controversial.44 Indeed, many scholars are of the opinion that at the time 
of the adoption of the VCLT, that rule did not reflect established practice but rather a 
development of the law.45 That being the case, there could not have been a breach of that 
rule during the emergency period. Moreover, even if Britain had such a duty at that time, 
it would be a duty held under the law of treaties itself. This is a duty vis-à-vis other state 
parties to conventions whose object Britain’s acts may be alleged to have frustrated. It is 
not a duty owed to individuals. Nor can Kenya as a state act for its nationals for the 
obvious reason that it is not a state-party to the ECHR and thus lacks locus standi.  
 
                                                          
42 The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu (Trial Judgement), ICTR-96-4-T, International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), 2 September 1998. 
43 The ECHR preamble, “Considering that this Declaration aims at securing the universal and 
effective recognition and observance of the Rights therein declared”. 
44 Duncan BH (2001) The Oxford Guide to Treaties, Oxford University Press, 212. 






An exception to the limits of the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) ratione temporis are cases originating before the entry into force of the ECHR 
and persisting thereafter. These are different from “instantaneous facts”,46 which cease 
before that critical date. While the emergency continued long after 1953, as seen above, 
torture was not part of it thereafter. Unlike disappearances or continued denial of access 
to property, the nature of torture and other forms of violence is that they last only as long 
as the acts inducing the suffering continue. However, considering the treatment of Jewish 
holocaust victims as a single collective for purposes of reparation,47 can the Mau Mau be 
regarded as part of a collective, thus, enabling the tortures to be taken into account as 
aspects of continuous violations of the human rights of a people? Unfortunately for the 
claimants, there is no evidence that the Mau Mau were targeted on the basis of their 




It must also be stated that in addition to the temporal limitations discussed above, there is 
also a territorial limitation. In the ECHR regime, unless a state has made a declaration 
under article 56 extending application of the Convention to its dependant territories, the 
application will be incompatible ratione loci.49 Common article 1 of the Geneva 
                                                          
46 Council of Europe: European Court of Human Rights, Practical Guide on Admissibility 
Criteria , 2011, at 41, available at www.echr.coe.int 
47 Barkan E (2001) The Guilt of Nations: Restitution and Negotiating Historical Injustices, at 5—
6. 
48 McVay K ‘Self-Determination in New Contexts: The Self-Determination of Refugees and 
Forced Migrants in International Law’ (2012) 28 Merkourios Journal of International and 
European Law 36, at 37; Ethnicity is among the traditional bases for defining “peoples” in 
international law.  
49 Admissibility Guide, at 39. Also, Gillow v United Kingdom (1986) 11 EHRR 335; Bui Van 
Thanh and Others v. the United Kingdom (Appl. no. 16137/90) Eur Comm’n HR 12 March 1990, 
65 DR (1990) 330. 
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Conventions, on the other hand, is understood as providing for universal application of 
the conventions50 but as discussed above, the four conventions are limited in other ways. 
 
What about the UN Charter?  
 
The human rights obligations of the UN Charter are not so clear. The precise language of 
the Charter is “promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental 
freedoms for all.”51 Nevertheless, the American Appeals Court in Filartiga above 
explained that UN declarations specify “with great precision” the obligations of member-
states of the UN under the UN Charter.52 Thus, the UDHR can be understood as 
enunciating those “human rights and fundamental freedoms” that states have pledged to 
promote in the UN Charter, such that they may not claim ignorance of the specifics of 
their Charter obligations regarding human rights and fundamental freedoms.53 Indeed, 
that court concluded that while these rights and freedoms remained undefined in 1980, 
they included “at the very least, the right to be free from torture.”54 
 
It is thus possible to argue that throughout the 1950s, Britain had a charter obligation to 
promote and encourage respect for the human right to be free from torture. Like the 
mandate system, this would seem to be a duty entailing common interests and no 
reciprocal rights on the part of the state-parties besides the right of enforcement. The 
question of “legal interests” and its relation to locus standi that the international court 
introduced in the South West Africa case55 would not pose a problem to Kenya, as a state 
                                                          
50 Chazournes LB & Condorelli L ‘Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions revisited: 
Protecting collective interests’ (2000) International Review of the Red Cross, No. 837, available 
at https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/57jqcp.htm 
51 UN Charter, article 1 (3). Article 55 refers to this as a duty of the UN as an organization, while 
in article 56 member-states pledge themselves to co-operate with the organization in achievement 
of its purposes. Human rights and fundamental freedoms are also referred to with reference to the 
duties/purposes of the General Assembly in article 13 (1) (b); ECOSOC in article 62 (2) and the 
International Trusteeship System in article 76 (c).  
52 Filartiga Case. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid. 
55 South West Africa cases (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa); Second 
Phase, International Court of Justice (ICJ), 18 July 1966. 
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clearly has an interest where its own nationals are concerned. Regardless, the fact that the 
UDHR was not considered binding at the time poses a challenge to this approach. 
 
In summary, it appears that positive substantive international law does not offer a sure 
basis for founding legal claims on the tortures that occurred during the Kenyan 
emergency period. 
 
II. The statement of the problem 
 
The above-described situation is symptomatic of claims based on historical injustices in 
general. While causes for reparation of historical injustices have sometimes led to 
restitution, compensation or apology, they have generally met with little success.56 In 
some countries, municipal law has been developed to accommodate the claims out of a 
sense of moral obligation or political responsibility.57 Sometimes, solutions have been 
found in creative reinterpretations of national laws in light of present day human rights 
values.58 On the international level, yet other claims have been resolved through a simple, 
direct, voluntary assumption of the duty to pay reparation for past wrongs 
unaccompanied by legislative changes or creative judicial reinterpretation of laws. But 
where municipal solutions are not available and the concerned government remains 
unwilling to pay for reparations, the prevailing view among scholars is that few claims, if 
any, can succeed on the basis of substantive international law.  
 
Thus, the call for redress of past wrongs is seen as constituting primarily moral claims—
serious claims to be sure, engaging the grave political responsibility on the part of the 
                                                          
56 Shelton D ‘The World of Atonement Reparations for Historical Injustices’ (2004) 1 Miskolc 
Journal of International Law, MiskolciNemzetköziJogiKözlemények, 2, 259-289, at 266—268. 
57 For example, the enactment of the Civil Liberties Act of 1988 (Pub.L. 100–383, title I, August 
10, 1988, 102 Stat. 904, 50a U.S.C. 1989b); Enacted by the American Government to 
accommodate Japanese-Americans interned during World War II. 
58 In Mabo v Queensland (No 2) ("Mabo case") [1992] HCA 23; (1992) 175 CLR 1 (3 June 
1992), the Australian High Court refused to apply discriminatory theories of sovereignty in the 
18th century that had the effect of dispossessing the Meriam people of ownership of their land and 
interpreted the past law without the past theories of sovereignty. 
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“guilty”59 states, although they remain non-legal claims. Thus, Du Plessis describes the 
claims as “political strategizing and moral argument in the pursuit of justice”.60 Indeed, 
the moral argument for reparation is unassailable, as Du Plessis puts it.61 It is translating 
this argument into a legal claim within the present system that presents a challenge.  
 
Besides the problems with substantive international law itself, as seen above, other 
challenges involve: difficulties in finding a proper forum, establishing locus standi (that 
is, finding a proper—and willing—claimant where the forum does not admit individual 
claims) and determining the appropriate manner of reparation (How does one quantify 
violations of peremptory norms?). However, this paper focusses on the question of 
substantive law. Given that many injustices are “historical” precisely because they pre-
exist relevant modern instruments and customs, how does one establish a legal wrong, for 
which reparation is due on the basis of something more than mere goodwill of “guilty” 
states? In other words, how does one solve the problem of inter-temporal law?  
 
a) Inter-temporal law 
 
Max Huber explained in the Island of Palmas case that, 
 
“a juridical fact must be appreciated in the light of the law contemporary 
with it, and not of the law in force at the time when a dispute in regard to it 
arises or falls to be settled.”62 
 
This is the principle of inter-temporal law, variously called “contemporaneity” or “non-
retroactivity” of law. It is the principle by which matters implicating several temporal 
                                                          
59 Barkan’s “Guilt of Nations” uses “guilty” rhetorically. 
60 Du Plessis, ‘Historical Injustice and International Law: An Exploratory Discussion of 
Reparation for Slavery’ 25 Human Rights Quarterly 3, 624-659, at 624. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Island of Palmas case (or Miangas), United States v Netherlands, Award, (1928) II RIAA 829, 
ICGJ 392 (PCA 1928), 4th April 1928, Permanent Court of Arbitration [PCA] (Hereinafter, 
Island of Palmas case). 
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strata in the development of law are determined by choosing among the competing laws 
of different times.  
 
This doctrine is a reflection and a natural product of the dynamic nature of international 
law,63 which develops over time through state-practice and opinio juris, such that, when 
seen through a historical lens, it appears to form layers of law. Because disputes are not 
necessarily resolved in tandem with the changes that occur in the law but often persist 
through these various changes or even emerge at a later time, a conflict of the laws of 
different epochs is inevitable. Thus, Max Huber explained that in addition to providing 
that the law contemporaneous with the act should apply, the principle also requires that 
the “continued manifestation” of a created right “shall follow the conditions required by 
the evolution of law”64—the second “leg” of the principle.  
 
As Elias explains, this principle reflects a Westphalian perspective of international law. 
This is a law between sovereigns, quite different from law “proper” as the manifestation 
of sovereignty or authority over subjects. Indeed, he dubs inter-temporality the most 
important product—in terms of general principles—of the Westphalian conception of law 
that has prevailed in international law for two centuries.65 Naturally, a law between 
sovereigns cannot permit obligations to exist between them without a clear expression of 
state consent: that would amount to subjecting one sovereign to another. That being the 
case, it seems only logical that laws must apply contemporaneously in accordance with 
the notion that the contemporaneous law represents the assumed obligations of the states 
concerned vis-à-vis the events in question. To impose obligations on states that they had 
not clearly assumed at the relevant time would be to undercut the very basis of 
international law as understood in purely positivist terms. Consequently, law—which is 
shorthand for “state consent” in this conception—must be sought in the traditional 
sources of international law as they stood on the critical date of the issues in dispute.  
 
                                                          
63 Elias TO ‘The Doctrine of International law’ (1980) 74 The American Journal of International 
Law 2, 285-307, at 291. 
64 Island of Palmas case. 
65 Ibid, at 285. 
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As already mentioned, this poses problems for reparations causes based on historical 
injustices such as the Mau Mau claims. It seems evident that if it is at all possible to find 
a legal route around it, such must be done through a principle that can transcend the 
restrictive system of international law discussed here so far. There can be no better 
candidate for such a task than concept of jus cogens. 
 
b) Jus cogens 
 
Unlike the generally resorted to human rights arguments among writers of historical 
injustices, an argument based on jus cogens seems, right from the start, to provide a much 
better chance at establishing a legal claim where substantive positive rules from the 
traditional sources are scarce. Jus cogens is uniquely defined as both independent from 
and superior to positive law. Per the VCLT,  peremptory norms are norms  
 
“from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only 
by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same 
character.”66  
 
The Latin phrase itself—jus cogens—means “compelling law”67 and unlike human rights, 
its basis is not explicitly indicated in any law and indeed is the subject of much debate. 
While not defined in explicit natural law terminology, jus cogens strongly implies 
naturalist notions such as timelessness and universality. It is also closely linked to the 
concepts of “community interests” and duties owed erga omnes. These concepts together 
introduce to international law an entity that is somewhat separate from and transcendent 
over states while including them as its essential components: the “international 
community as a whole,”68 or in the precise language of article 53 of the VCLT, “the 
international community of states as a whole’’  
 
However, despite this potential, Shelton reports: 
                                                          
66 VCLT, article 53. 
67 Black’s Law Dictionary, 7th Edition (1999) at 864. 




“A very few authors have tried to invoke the concept of jus cogens to give 
retroactive effect to certain norms.”69 
 
She goes on to explain the reason for this as she sees it: The inclusion of jus cogens 
in the VCLT represented “progressive development, not codification of 
international law”,70 an issue analyzed in chapter four of this thesis. In fact, it is the 
aim of this paper to explore, critique and attempt to provide answers to this and 
other challenges to the application of jus cogens to the Mau Mau and similar claims 
of historical injustices. 
 
c) Structure of the dissertation 
 
The next three chapters shall explore jus cogens as a basis for an argument that Britain is 
internationally responsible for the tortures of Mau Mau detainees and similar claims, the 
scarcity of binding positive rules of the international law contemporaneous with the 
events in question notwithstanding. It shall be argued that there is no good reason why jus 
cogens norms should not apply in determining past wrongs of a directly humanitarian 
nature. This is so especially where a direct link can be established between such past 
harm and present human suffering. Application of humanitarian peremptory norms 
wherever relevant subject matter is involved is justifiable and does not necessarily lead to 
legal chaos, as may be feared—where all manner of past acts are endlessly brought 
before tribunals and the past refuses to rest. 
 
Chapter two examines the question of state responsibility and inter-temporal law. A 
major obstacle lies in the very authoritative ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility,71 
whose position seems to be that jus cogens norms cannot impact cases that are rooted in 
                                                          
69 Shelton D (2008) Reparations for Indigenous Peoples: The Present Value of Past Wrongs. In: 
Lenzerini F Reparations for Indigenous Peoples: International and Comparative Perspectives, at 
162. 
70 Ibid. 
71 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts, November 2001, Supplement No. 10 (A/56/10), chp.IV.E.1. 
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events that occurred before their coming into force. A critique of this position is the 
subject of chapter two.  
 
Chapter three argues on the basis of a normative conflict between jus cogens and inter-
temporal law, particularly through the principles of the ILC conclusions on fragmentation 
of international law72 and those employed by the ICJ in the Jurisdictional Immunities 
case.73 Because of the unique problem of time, a conflict seems readily apparent yet not 
easily justified. Demonstrating the said conflict is the task of chapter three. 
 
Chapter four looks at the temporal scope of jus cogens in itself—including the scope of 
individual peremptory norms and their basis in morality. The impact and implications of 
the VCLT in their regard, including the complications of article 53 are discussed. 
 
Chapter five lays down arguments against rigid application of inter-temporality based on 
the theories of evolutionary interpretation of treaties and the interests of the international 
community as a whole, while Chapter six provides a conclusion. 
                                                          
72 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its Fifty-Eighth Session (1 May - 9 
June and 3 July - 11 August 2006) Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixty-First Session, 
Supplement No. 10 (Hereafter, ILC study on fragmentation). 
73 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece intervening), Judgment, 2012 
I.C.J. (February 3). 
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CHAPTER TWO: A CRITIQUE OF THE APPLICATION OF INTER-
TEMPORALITY IN THE LAW OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY—A 
JUS COGENS EXCEPTION? 
 
Article 31 of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility provides that full reparation is due 
for each “internationally wrongful act”.74 The duty to pay reparation then arises 
independently as a substantive duty of international law.75  For the cause of reparations 
for historical injustices, the challenge then is to find the internationally wrongful act for 
which reparation is due. Such an act must be attributable to a state76 and constitute a 
“breach of an international obligation of the state”.77  
 
There is no doubt that the acts of torture that British colonial officers inflicted on Mau 
Mau claimants constitute serious breaches of modern International Law. Such has already 
been admitted as far as the facts go, as indicated in chapter one. The question is: is 
modern international law relevant to the determination of this question in historical 
cases? Article 13 of the Draft Articles seems at first glance to answer in the negative. It 
provides that  
 
“an act of state does not constitute a breach of an international obligation 
unless the state is bound by the obligation in question at the time the act 
occurs.”  
 
This is the inter-temporal principle discussed in chapter one, which requires juridical 
facts to be examined in accordance with contemporaneous law. Indeed, the difficulty 
represented by inter-temporal law is nowhere better demonstrated than in the ILC’s 
treatment of the principle in the process of codifying the law on state responsibility. The 
ILC admits virtually no exceptions to the principle except voluntary assumption of 
responsibility—which of course, is no exception at all. To the ILC, not even jus cogens, 
                                                          
74 ILC Draft Articles (state responsibility), article 31. 
75 Ibid, article 31. 
76 Ibid, article 2(a). 
77 Ibid, article 2(b). 
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being of a higher status than inter-temporal law in international law, provides an 
exception to that rule. This chapter interrogates this position.  
 
I. Inter-temporality and jus cogens in the law of state responsibility 
 
The ILC’s position on this question, described above, appears by way of its commentary 
on Article 13 of the final Draft Articles.78 The position is simply that the law of inter-
temporality applies in the same way in the case of emergent peremptory norms as it does 
in the case of emergent non-peremptory norms.79 But it is argued here that such an 
absolutist position is not justified or adequately explained, specifically as it regards the 
effect of peremptory norms on inter-temporality.  
 
The problem with the ILC approach, as shall be argued throughout this chapter, is that it 
ignores the conceptual place of peremptory norms in international law and does not 
appear to provide an adequate explanation why exactly inter-temporal law should be 
unaffected by jus cogens. Peremptory norms by definition must be presumed to be pre-
eminent over any other non-peremptory rule or principle of international law, including 
inter-temporal law. It is therefore not enough to put the principle aside on account of 
scarcity of practice or jurisprudence, or even on account of practice and jurisprudence in 
which the principle was seemingly put aside. As Bjorge puts it,  
 
“If jus cogens constitutes the bedrock of the international legal order…then 
surely this constitutional backdrop is pertinent to the understanding of inter-
temporal law”80 
 
The ILC also concluded in its study on fragmentation of international law that, 
 
                                                          
78 'Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session (23 April 
to 1 June and 2 July to 10 August 2001)' [2001] II (2) Yearbook of the International Law 
Commission, at 57 – 59. 
79 Ibid, para (6). 




“International law is a legal system.  Its rules and principles (i.e. its norms) 
act in relation to and should be interpreted against the background of other 
rules and principles.”81 
 
Jus cogens being superordinate in this system, its relationship to and effects on other 
norms must not be dismissed lightly. In short, the rationale for the ILC approach 
regarding peremptory norms and inter-temporal law in the Draft Articles on State 
Responsibility is missing.  
 
a) The Vienna Convention 
 
The ILC position is principally based on the VCLT—particularly Article 71 2(b), which 
provides that an emergent peremptory norm “does not affect any right, obligation or legal 
situation of the parties created through the execution of the treaty prior to its termination, 
provided that those rights, obligations or situations may thereafter be maintained only to 
the extent that their maintenance is not in itself in conflict with the new peremptory 
norm.” 
 
In the commentary on the Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties82 before they became the 
VCLT, the Commission explained that it was felt inappropriate to treat pre-existing but 
conflicting (with peremptory norms) treaties as void ab initio.83 Instead, treaties that pre-
exist an emergent peremptory norm are considered invalid only from the moment of the 
emergence of the new peremptory norm—hence “terminated”84—in contrast to treaties 
contracted while a conflicting peremptory norm already exists, which are completely null 
and void.85 From this, the rule on state responsibility was extrapolated, namely, that the 
                                                          
81 Hereafter, ILC study on fragmentation, conclusion 1. 
82 'Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Eighteenth Session (23 April - 
1 June and 2 July - 10 August 1966)' [1966] II (2) Yearbook of the International Law Commission 
1. 





legal status of facts occurring before the emergence of a conflicting peremptory norm 
would not be in any way affected.  
 
However, Tavernier notes that the conclusion is not explicit in the VCLT.86 After all, 
only those pre-existing rights that conform to jus cogens may persist, per article 71 
quoted above. In other words, the conclusion reached by the ILC interpretation is not 
strictly necessary. Moreover, the VCLT’s authority itself—on the question of jus 
cogens—is a matter of debate.87 
 
b) State-Practice and Jurisprudence 
 
In addition to the above, the ILC relied on slavery cases as evidence of the non-
retroactivity of jus cogens. For example, the decisions of Joshua Bates, umpire of the 
United States-Great Britain Mixed Commission, were specifically cited.88  These cases 
concerned the confiscation of American slave-ships and the freeing of captured slaves 
found therein by British agents. The events in question had taken place at varied times, 
during which the law on slavery had changed. While it was wrongful for one state to 
capture and search the ship of another state during peace time, the slave-trade had long 
been banned by international law by the time Bates was hearing the cases, and such 
actions taken against the ships at that time would not have been considered illegal. The 
umpire applied the inter-temporal principle and declared the capture of ships and freeing 
of slaves to have been illegal where they were done before the ban on the slave-trade had 
been made an explicit part of international law.  
 
Bjorge explains that the ban on the trade could possibly have already acquired 
peremptory status by the time of the arbitration by Bates—though this was not stated89—
so that, based on this practice, the ILC might be entitled to consider as it does, that not 
                                                          
86 Crawford J, (2013) State Responsibility: The General Part, Cambridge University Press, 
quoting Tavernier at 250 (footnote 58). 
87 Discussed in chapter four. 
88 Commentary on Draft Articles (State Responsibility), at 57, para 2. 
89 Bjorge at 166. 
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even jus cogens provides an exception to the general principle of inter-temporal law. 
However, as noted by Bjorge himself, there exists contrary state practice, jurisprudence 
and doctrinal statements regarding the very same subject-matter.90 
 
One such practice is found in the terms of the German-French Compromis of 1880 setting 
up a claims commission for citizens of the two countries.  It excluded from among claims 
which could be brought before the Commission, any “claim, or item of loss or injury or 
damages based on the loss or emancipation of slaves.”91 Lammasch in 1913 relied on that 
practice to reach a conclusion that is diametrically opposed to that reached by the ILC in 
the Draft Articles. In his view, where an international tribunal finds itself having to 
render a decision that at the time of the judgment seems positively opposed to the 
prevailing public morals, “for example, to recognize the slave-trade as an acceptable 
commercial practice”,92 the tribunal is then authorized to abandon the principle leading to 
the unacceptable conclusion and to instead apply higher legal principles and equity.93 
 
In more modern times, the inter-American Court in the Aloeboetoe case94 considered a 
1762 treaty between the Saramaka tribe and the Republic of Suriname that included 
among its terms, the capture and sale of slaves. The Court regarded the treaty as being 
wholly incapable of invocation before a human rights tribunal. This was so even though 
the actual reason the treaty was invoked had nothing at all to do with the slave-trade or 
slavery itself. In point of fact, the treaty had been invoked for the purposes of establishing 
family structures in the Saramaka tribe, in order to determine compensation for relatives. 
But the Court seems to have regarded that treaty as a whole as being completely 
unqualified to be treated as law in any way. It could only have done so by judging the 
contents of the treaty against the fundamental public morals of modern international 
society. Indeed, such reasoning is in accord with the nature of jus cogens as understood in 
                                                          
90 Ibid at 165—167. 
91 Ibid. 
92 Ibid, citing Lammasch at 166. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Case of Aloeboetoe et al v Suriname, Aloeboetoe and Ors v Suriname, Reparations and costs, 
IACHR Series C no 15, [1993] IACHR 2, IHRL 1396 (IACHR 1993), 10th September 1993, 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights [IACtHR]. 
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modern international law: “Norms commanding peremptory authority, superseding 
conflicting treaties and custom.”95 It is therefore unclear why it should not be allowed 
any effect on the formulation of the rules of state responsibility with regards to inter-
temporality.  
 
In fact, the ILC had initially expressed a view that was somewhat similar to that of 
Lammasch, above.  Concerning the Bates decisions on the slave-trade, the ILC had 
initially advanced an argument saying that, had the matter been decided at a later 
period—when the ban on slavery was not only illegal but clearly considered peremptory, 
and, in addition, imposing compulsory obligations on states to actively combat the 
trade—it would not have been open to the umpire to determine as he did, that such action 
as freeing slaves was illegal in accordance with the contemporaneous law.96 Such a 
finding would be “inconceivable”97 especially when the change in law—from the 
prohibition of an act to its compulsory requirement by a jus cogens norm—had been one 
that was primarily moral or humanitarian in its purpose.98 
 
Another example given was a hypothetical case where one country (state A) bound to 
supply arms to another by treaty, refuses to do so knowing that such arms are to be used 
by state B to violate an oppressed people’s right of self-determination, at a time when that 
norm is still in the process of formation. Should the dispute between the two states be 
decided after the peremptory nature of the norm is clear, the commission did not consider 
it possible for state A to bear responsibility for its breach of the arms-treaty.99 In 
subsequent readings of the articles, however, the ILC deleted article 18(2) which had 
articulated this as a principle.100 
 
                                                          
95 Criddle EJ & Fox-Decent E ‘A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens,’ (2009) 34 Yale JIL, 331 at 
332; (Hereinafter, Criddle & Fox-Decent). 
96 Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Fifty-First Session (3 May - 23 
July 1999) Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-Fourth Session, Supplement No.10, 
at 101, paras 15—16. 
97 Ibid, para 16. 
98 Ibid, para 15. 
99 Ibid, at 101—102, para 17. 
100 ILC Report (1999) at 57, para 129. 
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The Special Rapporteur explained that the former reasoning had contemplated a scenario 
in which, on one day, an act is illegal, and then almost immediately after, it becomes 
compulsory through the operation of a peremptory norm.101 Such an occurrence is 
unknown in the history of international practice, hence the reluctance to include the 
reasoning based on it in the articles. However, it is again not quite certain why such 
reasoning need only apply in such an improbable scenario: where a drastic change in the 
law occurs in a matter of days. This is even more so when one considers that in the 
former discussion, it had not been the length of time in which the change occurred that 
had been the focus of the exposition, but rather the nature of the new law as (a) 
compulsory (b) moral-humanitarian and (c) peremptory.  
 
In any event, the principle is considered to have been reinserted into the articles by way 
of Article 26 which says,  
 
“Nothing in this chapter shall preclude the wrongfulness of any act of a 
state which is not in conformity with an obligation arising under a 
peremptory norm.”  
 
Hence—Crawford explains—“the emergence of a new peremptory norm is considered to 
be a circumstance precluding wrongfulness that has retrospective application.”102 This is 
essentially the principle that had been article 18(2) in the previous articles. The effect of 
this is that a breach will not be considered to have occurred where a party has acted 
contrary to an established norm, in contradiction of which a new peremptory norm later 
emerged requiring the very same act.103 
 
Therefore, a state can be precluded from relying on inter-temporal law to claim reparation 
from another state on the basis of an act constituting a past breach of a norm where the 
act is now required by a peremptory norm. However, the state cannot by the same token 
be precluded from relying, in its own defense, on a past permissive rule or the past 
                                                          
101 Crawford at 250.  




absence of a prohibitive rule. Stated positively, jus cogens prevents past “internationally 
wrongful acts” from being treated as such, but cannot be used to classify past permissible 
acts as “internationally wrongful acts.” The one clearly involves retroactive application of 
the emergent jus cogens norm, and the other, a refusal to do so. Yet the logic behind the 
distinction has not been fully articulated.  
 
Concerning the ECtHR’s refusal to adjudicate on disputes that arose before the state-
parties’ entrance into the Convention regime, the commentary explains,  
 
“The same principle has consistently been applied by the European 
Commission and the European Court of Human Rights to deny claims relating 
to periods during which the European Convention on Human Rights was not 
in force for the State concerned.”104 
 
While this position is correct, a distinction must be made between conventions as treaties 
and their substantive content, which may supersede the treaty. Much of what the ECHR 
provides is not only present in numerous other human rights instruments, but also in 
international customary law. Some of the conventional provisions are even of jus cogens 
status, such as the prohibition of torture in Article 3. It not the case that obligations 
indicated in the ECHR come into force for state-parties only after they become 
signatories to it. Rather, it is the Convention itself, along with its institutions, that comes 
into force for the party on that date.  
 
In fact, equally valid is an interpretation of the European jurisprudence as dealing with 
jurisdiction, so that the Court is seen as prudentially limiting its own sphere of 
competence to the Convention itself. As a treaty and being consent-based, the convention 
applies only to certain states and from certain times. Indeed, the Court sees its own role 
as “exclusively limited to direct supervisory functions”105 over the ECHR and thus must 
be dependent on it for its own jurisdiction. The ECtHR refuses to judge the pre-
                                                          
104 Commentary on Draft Articles (State Responsibility), at 58, para 2. 




Convention violations simply for lack of jurisdiction and not because the parties 
themselves are not otherwise bound by those substantive obligations. Moreover, the ICJ 
explained, 
 
“…there is a fundamental distinction between the acceptance by a state of the 
Court’s jurisdiction and the compatibility of particular acts with international 
law. The former requires consent. The latter question can only be reached 
when the Court deals with the merits, after having established its 
jurisdiction.”106 
 
Thus, Orakhelashvili‘s conclusion that the refusal by international tribunals to extend 
jurisdiction beyond the moment of consent is a principle that flows from inter-temporality 
per se107 is not necessary. For him, the consensual nature of judicial jurisdiction flows 
from the fact that international law “does not bind states without their consent.”108 That is, 
the court’s jurisdiction is limited by the fact that substantive obligations are not 
retroactive. To the contrary, as the ICJ’s explanation makes clear, this refusal flows from 
the fact that international tribunals have no automatic compulsory jurisdiction of their 
own, and not from the fact that substantive obligations do not exist. No link to inter-
temporality is necessary, and thus, no strict principles need be drawn from these 
decisions as far as the scope of jus cogens or even human rights are concerned. 
 
c) A Human rights exception? 
 
Moreover, scholars have expressed the view that there exists a human rights exception to 
the inter-temporal principle.109 Leaving aside the debate on which human rights have 
attained jus cogens status, the suggested exception refers to human rights obligations in 
general. The Special Rapporteur commented on the authorities cited for this exception: 
                                                          
106 Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Canada), 1998 I.C.J. 432 (Dec. 4) at para 55. 
107 Orakhelashvili A (2006) Peremptory Norms in International Law, Oxford University Press, 
New York, 491—492. 
108 Ibid at 491. 
109 Higgins R ‘Time and the Law: International Perspectives on an Old Problem’ 46 International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly, 501-520. 
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mainly Judge Tanaka’s oft-cited dissenting opinion in the South West Africa case and the 
Namibia case110 which Judge Higgins relied upon in explaining the exception.111 
 
In 1966,112 the ICJ interpreted the duty of mandatory states—the “sacred trust of 
civilization”113—according to the law of 1920 when the mandate system was created by 
the League of Nations. On the other hand, Judge Tanaka and the minority view held that 
the new generation of customary law on human rights, post-World-War-II, were 
indispensable in interpreting the terms of the mandate. Later, in 1971,114 the ICJ followed 
this latter view. The ECtHR has also treated the European Convention as a “living 
instrument”115 and applied later standards of human rights in international customary law 
as opposed to those of the time when the treaty was concluded. 
 
The Special Rapporteur explains that, in his view, the above does not constitute an 
exception to inter-temporality at all.116 This is because there is no inherent incompatibility 
between inter-temporal law and the evolutionary theory of interpretation of treaties—
Max Huber’s second “leg” in his definition of the principle, now embodied in article 31 
of the VCLT.117 
 
However, Judge Tanaka’s view had involved more than the evolutionary theory of 
interpretation. For him, the logic of inter-temporal law lies in the notion of “acquired 
rights”, such that new law cannot be used to deprive legal subjects of rights already held 
on the basis of an old law. The Judge evidently did not regard the mere absence of clearly 
stated positive rules prohibiting inhuman conduct as conferring a right on South Africa to 
engage in said conduct. There was therefore no “right” acquired that could be the subject 
                                                          
110 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South 
West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971 
I.C.J. 16 (June 21). 
111 South-West Africa Cases advisor (Judge Tanaka’s Dissenting Opinion). 
112 Ibid at 294. 
113 League of Nations, Covenant of the League of Nations, 28 April 1919, article 22.  
114 Namibia case. 
115 Tyrer v United Kingdom (1978) ECtHR, 5856/72. 
116 Crawford at 247—250. 
117 VCLT, article 31 (3) (c) provides that interpretation of treaties should take into account “any 
relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties.” 
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of protection by the inter-temporal principle. This understanding of inter-temporality is 
echoed by Judge Al-Khasawneh in the Bakassi case.118 
 
“Furthermore, it is perhaps in the realm of criminal law that the rule of inter-
temporal law comes to the forefront and lends itself to delineation. This is so 
because the temporal aspect in the maxim nullum crimen nulla poena sine 
lege requires a precise definition, yet it was precisely in this same realm that 
the rule has been significantly abandoned. Thus, the operation of the rule 
would have acted to shield the perpetrators of grave crimes in World War II 
from criminalization because many of these crimes were not part of positive 
law, but in the event, as is well known, that protection afforded by adherence 
to inter-temporal law was not accepted. If such was the case where the law 
was more precise, the concept itself more readily delineated and the 
consequences, criminalization, grave, I see no reason why a behaviour that is 
incompatible with modern rules of international law and morally 
unacceptable by modern values underlying those rules should be shielded by 
reference to inter-temporal law, al1 the more so when the reprobation of later 
times manifests itself not in criminalization but merely in invalidation.”119 
 
These judges view inter-temporality primarily as something that shields, and that should 
therefore not be allowed to shield indiscriminately. However, Judge Tanaka’s statement 
that there can be no recognized “right to inhumanity”120 is somewhat confusing. While it 
can be interpreted as a statement of his view on general law, the fact that he links it to the 
mandate system makes it impossible to presume so automatically. This is because the 
premise of his denial of the “right to be inhumane” appears to be the fact that the mandate 
does not exist for the mandatory’s benefit, in which case there can be no rights but only 
obligations. 
 
                                                          
118 Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nig.), 2002 I.C.J. 
303 (Order of Oct. 10). 




Put differently, would the expressed view differ if the treaty in question was one that did 
not have as its purpose ethical aims, but that nonetheless affected human rights 
substantially or detrimentally? Could a treaty focused on state “rights” and not 
obligations confer the “right to inhumanity” on state-parties that Judge Tanaka denies to 
South Africa and other mandatories? Or is the source of obligation—be it treaty, custom 
or general principle, new or old norms—unimportant? Restated, is the “right to 
inhumanity” denied merely because of the nature of the treaty involved—one of trust or 
obligation—or is it denied because there is in fact, no such recognizable right to act 
inhumanely in international law?  
 
This refusal to recognize a “right to be inhumane” is not much different from the inter-
American Court’s treatment of the “Surinamese-Suramaka treaty” cited above, which it 
refused to regard as a legal instrument, thus invalidating it retrospectively. In the views of 
the above-quoted ICJ judges, states cannot be viewed as being completely unrestricted in 
matters of human rights merely because of a lack of clarity in the rules. In Judge 
Tanaka’s words, 
 
“What ought to have been clear 40 years ago has been revealed by the creation 
of a new customary law which plays the role of authentic interpretation the 
effect of which is retroactive.”121 
 
So, while the minority view unmistakably deals with the evolutionary theory of 
interpretation, it is impossible to say that it is not speaking also of retroactivity when it 
says that states had no right to act a certain way before positive international law clearly 
prohibited such behavior. Moreover, if the new customary rule on human rights has 
retrospective effect on treaties, why should it lack similar effect on the general 
international law? 
  
d) Nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege 
 
                                                          
121 Ibid at 294. 
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Connected to the preceding discussion is the theoretical exception to inter-temporality, 
also rejected by the ILC. This is the principle of legality, referred to above in Judge Al-
Khasawneh’s quote. More precisely, the exception is based on the rare incidents in state 
practice and the jurisprudence of international and municipal courts where the principle 
of legality has not been applied. While it is generally established in modern international 
law that law should not be applied retroactively to criminalize certain actions, this rule 
has not been absolute. 
 
At Nuremberg, for example, the concept of “crimes against humanity” was written into 
the charter of the tribunal122 to fill a gap that then existed in international law as far as 
some of the Nazi atrocities were concerned.123 Specifically, these were crimes committed 
within Germany itself against Germany’s own people. Before then, it had generally been 
understood that international law did not concern itself with how states treated their own 
subjects within their own borders. However, this did not deter the tribunal from 
subjecting the accused persons to prosecution for some of those—then only recently 
“positivised”—international crimes. 
 
Israeli courts followed suit in the Eichmann trial124 and in a subsequent appeal 
therefrom.125 Eichmann was a former Nazi official who had been illegally kidnapped and 
transported to Israel from Argentina for trial.126 The justification given was that the 
                                                          
122 United Nations, Charter of the International Military Tribunal - Annex to the Agreement for 
the prosecution and punishment of the major war criminals of the European Axis ("London 
Agreement"), 8 August 1945; article 6 (c) provides jurisdiction for “Crimes against humanity: 
namely, murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed 
against any civilian population, before or during the war, or persecutions on political, racial or 
religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the 
Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated.” 
123 Schabas W (2012) Unimaginable Atrocities: Justice, Politics, and Rights at the War Crimes 
Tribunals, Oxford University Press, 50—51. 
124 Attorney-General of the Government of Israel v Adolf Eichmann, District Court of Jerusalem, 
Israel (December 12, 1961) International Law Reports, Vol. 36. (1968) at 18—276. 
125  Eichmann v Attorney General, Supreme Court of Israel (May 29, 1962) International Law 
Reports, Vol. 36. (1968) at 18—276. 
126 Inazumi M (2005) Universal Jurisdiction in Modern International Law: Expansion of 
National Jurisdiction for Prosecuting Serious Crimes under International Law, 63. 
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illegal character of the offence of genocide should have been obvious to everyone due to 
its grave moral reprehensibility.127  
 
The court seems to say that the law at the relevant time included the prohibition of 
genocide, the lack of a definite rule to that effect notwithstanding. Alternatively, it 
suggests that acts contrary to universal morality do not require legislation. This is 
justified by the fact that justice, which is the principle purpose of the principle of legality 
in this Court’s view, is not violated in the case of crimes so “odious” as genocide and 
“crimes against humanity” and in such “scope and dimensions” as were carried out by the 
Nazis.128 Hence, crimen nulla poena sine lege in this case “loses its moral value and is 
devoid of any ethical foundation.”129 It can therefore be said that in the eyes of the Israeli 
Court, the question was not just a matter of retroactive application of the law but also an 
argument from some form of non-positivist conception of international law, as argued 
later in chapter four. 
 
Similarly, the cases of CR vs United Kingdom and SW vs United Kingdom130 each 
consisted of the convictions of a man for the rape of his wife (in CR, it was attempted 
rape). The act had been committed when the common law of England still recognized, or 
appeared to recognize, a marital immunity for husbands with regard to forceful 
intercourse with their own wives. More precisely, rape consisted of “unlawful” 
intercourse and the English common law did not regard forceful intercourse with one’s 
own wife as “unlawful”. Upon application to the ECtHR on the basis of article 7131 of the 
                                                          
127 Eichmann case (Appeal) at point no. 13. 
128 This is essentially the argument in chapter four, wherein the moral nature of jus cogens is seen 
as essential in determining its temporal scope. 
129 Ibid. 
130 S.W. v United Kingdom: C.R. v United Kingdom (1995) 21 EHRR 363. 
131 ECHR, article 7 provides, “1) No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account 
of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence under national or international 
law at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that 
was applicable at the time the criminal offence was committed. 2) This Article shall not prejudice 
the trial and punishment of any person for any act or omission which, at the time when it was 




ECHR (which prohibits retroactive application of criminal law), the UK judgments were 
held to be in accordance with the convention.  
 
The European Court relied on the reasoning of the UK courts regarding the common law, 
which was to the effect that by the time the offence had occurred, the common law could 
no longer be considered as sanctioning the rape by husbands of their wives for any reason 
whatsoever. This was due to the progressive changes in social views on the matter that 
had taken place in British society and the progressive evolution of the principle by the 
UK courts over a number of cases spanning a number of years—though they had not yet 
led to a clear rejection of the immunity of husbands in the law. Essentially, the reasoning 
applied in dismissing the application was that the defendants should have known that 
they could no longer rely on the state of the contemporaneous law regarding the matter,  
as it had been clear at the time the acts occurred that the law was changing and that such 
conduct was surely going to be prohibited. In the face of its imminent over-turning, the 
applicants were not entitled to any expectation that the law would grant them immunity. 
The European Court’s view was also bolstered by the fact that the conduct of which the 
accused had been convicted was itself in contravention of values and rights protected by 
the ECHR. 
 
Again, as in the Eichmann case in Israel, it is not completely clear whether the court was 
applying the law retroactively, or simply claiming that the law in question already existed 
at the relevant time despite the absence of clear notice to the defendant in the form of a 
plainly defined positive rule. It is also possible that the Court’s view is based on the same 
premise as the Israeli Court’s judgment, regarding the lack of injustice in applying the 
law retroactively in that particular case. 
 
In the end, it appears that the entire reasoning based on the principle of legality has been 
rejected by the ILC. This conclusion may be influenced by the fact that the principle of 
legality has become a fundamental rule in criminal and human rights law, evidenced in 
the ECHR itself, though this does not necessarily mean that the former incidents were 




It may also be contended that the principle, being a criminal law principle, cannot, 
together with its possible exceptions, be deemed applicable to the law of state 
responsibility. Yet this is not sustainable either. As Judge Al-Khasawneh said in 
reference to the abandonment of inter-temporality at Nuremberg, if a principle is 
applicable in criminal law, its attendant grave consequences notwithstanding, then all the 
more so is it applicable to other legal situations, even those implicating states as subjects. 
Moreover, to regard international laws as possibly theoretically retrospective for 
individuals but not for states would amount to placing a greater burden of responsibility 
for their observance on individuals rather than on states, which are in fact the direct 
subjects of international law.  
 
This leaves state consent as the only acceptable way of justifying the criminal law 
exceptions without implicating automatic application in state responsibility. State 
consent, after all, needs no justification, for states are free to contract on all matters 
excepting those violating jus cogens. In fact, the ILC recognizes this in the commentary 
by providing as an exception to article 13, that states can voluntarily assume 
responsibility for past wrongs. Thus, such exceptions to the principle of legality as 
discussed above might be explained by describing them as simple expressions of state 
acts expanding the temporal scope of the new laws into the past.132 
 
Nonetheless, while it is easy to justify the expansion of the scope of a rule of jus cogens 
thus, it is not so easy to justify its contraction based only on state consent. The latter 
would be the case if we assumed that the rule of jus cogens enjoys a wide temporal scope 
in itself, an argument that is explored in chapter 4. As is discussed later (also in chapter 
4), jus cogens does not depend merely on positive law but on the substantive character of 
the actual norm itself and the function it serves vis-à-vis the international community 
interest. This is indicated by the ILC in its commentary on the Draft Articles that became 
                                                          
132 The same position is declared in resolution no. 2 of ‘Intertemporal Problem in Public 
International Law’, 56 Ann. de l'Institut de Droit Int'l 537 (1975). 
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the VCLT,133 and in the debates that went into the preparatory work for those articles and 
finally, the treaty and Draft Articles on State Responsibility. It is therefore difficult to 
rationalize the limitation of the scope of jus cogens merely by appealing to some 
expression of state consent, without also grounding it on some substantive basis in an 




As hopefully became apparent in the preceding discussion, a distinction is made between 
situations involving a “simple act”134 from those involving some kind of legal rule. The 
former refers to a situation where the contemporaneous law does not appear to have dealt 
directly or explicitly in any way with the subject-matter. As a result, these acts are 
generally presumed to have been legal at the time they occurred simply because they 
were not clearly prohibited. The ICJ’s ruling in the Lotus case135 discussed in the next 
chapter establishes this principle, which would appear to be the assumption of the ILC in 
the preceding discussion. 
 
The other case, as indicated, involves a situation where a positive rule from the period the 
act occurred has since been reversed through a peremptory norm. In particular, it 
concerns acts that previously have been prohibited by some rule of international law, only 
to be made compulsory later on by operation of a norm of jus cogens. The ILC gives 
some retroactive application to this type of act through draft article 26 as a circumstance 
precluding wrongfulness.  
 
The alternative situation is dealt with differently: an act may have been a simple act or it 
may have been a positive136 legal obligation—authorized or even required by way of 
treaty, custom or general principle—but later prohibited by a peremptory norm. The 
                                                          
133 Commentary on Draft Articles (Law of Treaties), at 247, para 1. 
134 Crawford uses the term at 251.  
135 S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7). 
136 “Positive” is used here as referring to the performance of some act, as opposed to a negative 
obligation (requiring the subject to refrain from an act). It has nothing to do with the theory of 
positivism contrasted with natural law theory. 
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sense of a conflict between norms exists more clearly in the latter case, the significance 
of which is discussed in the next chapter. In either of these two cases, the ILC does not 
permit the peremptory norm any retroactive effects, unlike the case where a prohibited 
act becomes compulsory. There is no rationale for the distinction, however. 
 
Given the place of jus cogens vis-à-vis non-peremptory norms, it would seem that the 
proper and logical approach should be to presume the application of jus cogens (where 
relevant subject matter is concerned, of course) unless its non-application is justified, and 
such justification is clearly reasoned.  Instead, it would appear that the opposite approach 
has been taken: It is presumed that inter-temporal law must always apply, and failing to 
find a rule of custom or treaty authorizing a jus cogens exception —in the case of simple 
acts—the possibility is simply dismissed. The difference is not an academic one because 
it leads to different conclusions. In summary, and in light of the above discussion, it is 
not justified to take a categorical and uncompromising stance based on the inter-temporal 
principle where jus cogens is concerned without an adequate explanation for this 
approach being attempted. 
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CHAPTER THREE: DOES JUS COGENS TRUMP INTER-
TEMPORAL LAW? ARGUMENTS FROM PRINCIPLES OF 
NORMATIVE CONFLICT 
 
In the ILC study on the fragmentation of international law, “relationships of conflict” in 
the international legal system are said to exist where “two norms that are both valid and 
applicable point to incompatible decisions so that a choice must be made between 
them.”137 The international legal practitioner is then directed to the basic rules of the 
VCLT for resolution of the varied forms of normative conflicts in international law, 
including the several principles set out in the 42 conclusions of the referenced study. Of 
importance is conclusion 42, which provides, 
 
“Conflicts between rules of international law should be resolved in accordance 
with the principle of harmonization, as laid out in conclusion (4).138 In the case 
of conflict between one of the hierarchically superior norms referred to in this 
section and another norm of international law, the latter should, to the extent 
possible, be interpreted in a manner consistent with the former.  In case this is 
not possible, the superior norm will prevail.” 
 
From the above, normative conflict is determined by establishing: a) the presence of two 
norms of international law; b) the requirement that both norms be valid and applicable in 
the relevant subject matter; and c) the requirement that the two norms point to 
incompatible decisions, forcing a choice to be made between them. 
 
On the other hand, the ICJ has recently dealt with the subject of normative conflict 
involving jus cogens in the Jurisdictional Immunities case. The international court was 
tasked with answering the question of the meaning and effect of a conflict between an 
ordinary rule/principle of international law and jus cogens—in particular, a conflict 
                                                          
137 ILC study on fragmentation, conclusion 2. 
138 Conclusion 4 titled “The Principle of Harmonization”, says, “When several norms bear on a 




alleged to exist between state immunity and the rules of International Humanitarian Law 
flouted by Germany in Italy in the course of the conduct of hostilities in World War II.  
 
As Hernández says, this case is significant because it is the only case in which the 
International Court has dealt directly and decisively with the question of “the effects of 
characterizing a legal rule as jus cogens.”139 According to him, there were a number of 
ways that the court could have gone about resolving the questions before it without laying 
down principles that would then have great effect beyond this particular case140 (and 
indeed, beyond the specific question of the relationship between state immunity and jus 
cogens). Instead, the ICJ found a resolution that Hernández considers “unusually 
decisive, resolving not only the case before it but taking a position of principle.”141This 
principle was based on the Court’s “considered view” on the “form of rules of jus 
cogens” and “on the nature of the norm within the international legal order, and how it 
ought to be interpreted and applied.”142 
 
Indeed, it can be objected that the court in Jurisdictional Immunities was dealing with a 
specific contradiction—between jus cogens and state immunity—and it would therefore 
be inappropriate to apply the principles articulated therein to a principle such as inter-
temporal law that was not then in consideration, at least as far as this question of a 
conflict with jus cogens is concerned.143 
 
However, this objection does not stand. This is evident in the presumptions the court 
makes as it proceeds to test state immunity against its understanding of what a conflict 
with jus cogens entails. There is nothing in these presumptions of the court that is 
                                                          
139 Hernández GI ‘A Reluctant Guardian: The International Court of Justice and the Concept of 
‘International Community’ (2013) British Yearbook of International Law   . Hereinafter, this 
article is referred to as: Hernández (Reluctant guardian). 
140 Ibid at 43—45.  
141 Ibid at 43. 
142 Ibid. 
143 The court did discuss inter-temporal law (page 124, para 58), but it did so with regard to state 
immunity (an ordinary principle) and not the substantive IHL rules prohibiting German conduct. 
Hence, no conclusion can be drawn from that paragraph regarding the question of a conflict 
between inter-temporal law and jus cogens. 
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inherently specific to state immunity per se. Rather, the court is testing state immunity 
against its assumptions about what a conflict with a peremptory norm involves—
assumptions that largely correspond with the general principles in the conclusions on the 
study on fragmentation of international law, above-cited.  
 
This chapter focusses on principles used to establish normative conflict in the 
Jurisdictional Immunities case and two of the principles set forth in conclusion 2 of the 
ILC study on fragmentation, referenced earlier. The question of validity and applicability 
is slated for discussion in chapter four where the temporal sphere of jus cogens in 
international law is considered more directly.  
 
I. The Jurisdictional Immunities case: Meaning and effect of normative 
conflict with a peremptory norm 
 
In this case, the theory that there exists a hierarchy of norms in International law atop of 
which sits the jus cogens was accepted by the ICJ in principle, as in other cases (for 
example, the Kosovo144 and Nuclear Weapons145 advisory opinions). However, the 
hierarchy that the ICJ has in mind is much less ambitious than had been the view of many 
scholars.146 The supremacy of jus cogens has been construed in the narrowest sense 
                                                          
144 Accordance with Int’l Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the Provisional 
Inst. of Self-Gov’t of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. (July 22); The court declared 
unlawful a declaration of independence made in connection with violations of the rules of jus ad 
bellum. 
145Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. (July 8)— 
The court described norms of IHL (jus in bello), as “intransgressible principles of international 
customary law” binding all, whether they acceded to the 6 conventions or not. [These are the four 
1949 Geneva Conventions and two Additional Protocols (International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC), Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to 
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 
3; International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International 
Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 609)]. The court also stated that “the 
intrinsically humanitarian character” of IHL “permeates the entire law of armed conflict and 
applies to all forms of warfare and to all kinds of weapons, those of the past, those of the present 
and those of the future.” 
146 Lucas B ‘International Law and The International Court of Justice’s Decision in Jurisdictional 
Immunities of the State’ 13 Melbourne Journal of International Law 2 (2012), 774, at 777—781. 
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possible: jus cogens indeed trumps all law that comes into conflict with it, but conflict 
means no more than to be in direct contradiction of the substantive content of a specific 
peremptory norm.  
 
Briefly, the facts of the case were as follows: Having violated the imperatives of IHL 
rules in World War II, Germany had sought to rely on state immunity in a municipal civil 
suit based on these violations before the courts of Italy.147 In its turn, Italy—after denying 
Germany the state immunity it had sought in Ferrini and Distomo  (based on a decision 
of Greek courts)148—sought to rely on jus cogens and other arguments before the ICJ 
after Germany instituted a suit based on this denial of immunity.  
 
The Court’s solution, in summary, was that a conflict cannot exist between state 
immunity and jus cogens because the rules of state immunity “do not bear upon the 
question whether or not the conduct in respect of which the proceedings are brought was 
lawful or unlawful.”149The view of the international system as some form of vertical 
constitutional order in which jus cogens sits at the very top compelling all law to be 
consistent with its objects and purposes both directly and indirectly was thus rejected. In 
this, the court followed a long line of jurisprudence—Al-Adssani150 and 
Kalogeropoulou151 at the ECtHR and a string of municipal court decisions152—all of 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Lucas gives an overview of the doctrinal debate between various scholars and courts from the 
1990s up to the Jurisdictional Immunities decision by the ICJ. One party held to Italy’s position 
as argued before the ICJ, that conflict with a norm of jus cogens status is defined as existing 
whenever the application of a peremptory norm is restricted by the operation of another principle 
or whenever the operation of a principle of international law is to render a peremptory norm 
incapable of producing legal consequences. The other party asserted a more traditional and 
horizontal approach to international law according to which only that which directly conflicts 
with the substantive content of the norm would qualify as contrary. 
147 Ferrini v. Federal Republic of Germany, decision No. 5044/2004, International Law Reports 
(ILR), Vol. 128, p. 658.  
148 Cited in Jurisdictional Immunities case at 115—166, para. 33—35. 
149 Jurisdictional Immunities at 140, para 93. 
150 Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom  [GC], application No. 35763/97, Judgment of 21 November 
2001, ECHR Reports 2001-XI, p. 101. 
151 Kalogeropoulou and Others v. Greece and Germany, Application No. 59021/00, Decision of 
12 December 2002, ECHR Reports 2002-X, p. 417. 
152 Jones v. Saudi Arabia, House of Lords, [2007] 1 AC 270 ; ILR, Vol. 129, p. 629; Canada 
(Bouzari v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Court of Appeal of Ontario, DLR, 4th Series, Vol. 243, p. 
406 or ILR, Vol. 128, p. 586); Poland (Natoniewski, Supreme Court, Polish Yearbook of 
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which declined or failed to rely on jus cogens to deny sovereign immunity to a state in a 
civil suit before a municipal court of another state. Importantly for this discussion, 
however, the court did look upon jus cogens as having a limiting effect on all norms, in 
the sense that it disallows any rule whose effect is to contradict the substantive 
prohibition of the peremptory norm.153 
 
To the court, the impact of the jus cogens is in its substantive content. That is, in the 
determination of the legal status of simple acts of states that come directly under its 
prohibition or compulsion. As such, contradiction of jus cogens exists only where there is 
competition between a peremptory norm and a non-peremptory norm in conferring legal 
status to the specific conduct (of a state) in question. This of course seems to match quite 
well the meaning of “conflict” given in the ILC’s conclusion 2 in its study on 
fragmentation cited earlier, according to which, contradiction or conflict comes down to a 
situation where “opposite decisions” derive from the application of two norms, thus 
forcing a choice to be made between them. Again, in the Court’s words, 
 
“recognizing the immunity of a foreign State in accordance with customary 
international law does not amount to recognizing as lawful a situation 
created by the breach of a jus cogens rule….”154 
 
Indeed, the court had emphasized throughout that case that the illegal nature or status of 
Germany’s conduct at the relevant time was not in question: Murder, ill-treatment and 
deportation to slave labor of civilians in occupied territory or prisoners of war155 
remained serious breaches of international law. Germany had fully accepted both the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
International Law, Vol. XXX, 2010, p. 299); Slovenia (case No. Up-13/99, Constitutional Court 
of Slovenia); New Zealand (Fang v. Jiang, High Court, [2007] NZAR, p. 420 or ILR, Vol. 141, p. 
702) and Greece (Margellos, Special Supreme Court, ILR, Vol. 129, p. 525. 
153 In that view,  jus cogens would seem to potentially transform the very structure of 
international law. For example, following this reasoning to its full logical consequences, all 
treaties would have to be judged in terms of their potential to block the application or 
enforcement of jus cogens and not just in terms of their conformity with substantive prohibitions 
or obligations of jus cogens status. 
154 Ibid. 
155 Nuremberg Charter, article 6 (b) (War crimes).  
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illegality of the acts in question and the duty to make reparations for them (while 
insisting on having fully met its obligation to pay for reparation in relation to the said 
violations of IHL). But for the ICJ, what mattered was the fact that there had been no 
principle proposed for application in either Ferrini or before itself that purported to 
classify Germany’s conduct in the war as legal or permissible in international law.  
 
The ICJ also cited the procedural nature of sovereign immunity in contrast with the 
substantive nature of the jus cogens norm as crucial.156 The two sets of norms “address 
different matters”,157 namely: a) jurisdiction—whether one state had jurisdiction over the 
subject matter or over the defendant state in the municipal case (sovereign immunity); 
and b) the legality of specific acts in armed conflict—whether these acts were permitted 
or not (substantive IHL rules).158 The other means considered by the court by which a 
conflict could arise was if the application of that principle of state immunity amounted to 
“rendering aid and assistance in maintaining”159 a situation caused by the breach of a jus 
cogens rule, per article 41 of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility.160 
 
“Aid and assistance” 
 
The ICJ found that no “aid or assistance” to support the results of a breach of jus cogens 
had been rendered in the Ferrini case. This was despite the fact that applying the rule on 
state immunity would have effectively ensured that the personal injury to Mr. Ferrini (a 
situation directly caused by German violation of the rules of war) would remain 
unrepaired. It would seem at first glance that such could be interpreted as assisting 
Germany in maintaining a situation caused by a breach of jus cogens. From Italy’s 
perspective, recognizing Germany’s immunity could be seen as coming into direct 
conflict with Italy’s own substantive obligations regarding the relevant peremptory 
                                                          




160 Article 41 provides, “No State shall recognize as lawful a situation created by a serious breach 
within the meaning of article, nor render aid or assistance in maintaining that situation.” 
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norm—a conflict between the duty that Italy owes to Germany on a bilateral basis (state 
immunity), and the one it owes erga omnes under peremptory norms of IHL.  
 
The court did not provide an argument for its finding regarding this particular form of 
conflict with jus cogens, but it did emphasize that the duty to make reparation was 
entirely distinct from the peremptory norm itself and considered that no rule existed in 
international law requiring that compensation be made in full.161 It is clear then, that to 
the court, the “situation” caused by a breach of jus cogens (that must not be maintained) 
does not include the injuries suffered by victims of violations of peremptory norms—at 
least, not on an individual basis. 
 
In fact, the commentary to article 41 gives examples of the kinds of “situations” referred 
to:162 The continued occupation of land that has been taken contrary to rules of jus ad 
bellum;163 and the continued denial of the right of self-determination of peoples (apartheid 
and colonial rule).164 Such a situation must not be given recognition, either formally or 
impliedly.165The court evidently understands the rule in article 41 as referring to 
continued breaches of the norm itself and not simply any “situation caused by the breach 
of jus cogens.” In essence, for conflict in the manner of “aid and assistance”, the right or 
value protected by the peremptory norm continues to be denied, violated or threatened. 
 
II. Applying the principles of normative conflict to inter-temporal law and jus 
cogens 
 
Besides the matter of aid and assistance, other factors considered key in determining 
whether a conflict arises between an ordinary legal principle, rule or norm and one that is 
jus cogens discussed above were: a) Whether a principle of international law purports to 
render legal the substantive prohibitions of the norms of jus cogens (or alternatively, 
                                                          
161 Ibid at 140, para 94. 
162 Commentary on Draft Articles (State Responsibility), at 114—115. 
163 Ibid at 114, para 5—7. 
164 Ibid at 115, para 8. 
165 Ibid at 114, para 5. 
42 
 
whether it purports to render illegal the substantive compulsory requirements of the 
norms of jus cogens); b) Whether the claimed conflicting norms are of the same nature, 
or deal with the same matter in contradictory ways. Hence, if one is substantive and the 
other procedural, establishing contradiction is impossible. From conclusion 2 on the ILC 
fragmentation study, the factors were: a) the presence of two norms of international law; 
b) the requirement that both norms be valid and applicable in the relevant subject matter; 
and c) the requirement that the two norms point to incompatible decisions, forcing a 
choice to be made between them. All these factors have been distilled into the two 
sections discussed below. 
 
a) The duality of jus cogens and inter-temporal law: substantive and procedural 
elements 
 
Comparing inter-temporality with jus cogens is difficult because the concepts entail two 
intertwined aspects that are relevant to the court’s reasoning in Jurisdictional Immunities. 
In inter-temporal law, there is inter-temporality itself and the past substantive norm that 
inter-temporality brings forward for application in the present. But there are two elements 
to jus cogens as well. One concerns the relationship between jus cogens and the “simple 
act” referenced in chapter two—the substantive issue. Thus, aggression, genocide, 
torture, slavery, colonialism, and violations of jus in bello, are all unconditionally 
prohibited. No state must regard itself as having the option of committing any of these 
acts in any circumstances whatsoever. But the other element concerns the relationship 
between the peremptory norm and other legal rules and principles (non-derogability). 
While the former deals with the lawfulness of a certain act, the latter deals with 
lawfulness of a certain law.  
 
Essentially, the relationship between each of the above elements and jus cogens must be 
considered. This is because, while the matter took place in the distant past, its 
determination occurs in the present where a tribunal has before it several substantive 
norms from different time-periods dealing with the same question. Inter-temporality, in 
the strict sense in which it was understood by the ILC in the Draft Articles on State 
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Responsibility, is a rule that unconditionally directs the tribunal to pick the older norm 
over the latter one wherever a question of state responsibility is involved.  
 
Because of the dual nature of both inter-temporal law and jus cogens, it seems impossible 
to neatly separate the substantive and the procedural elements in determining whether a 
contradiction exists, as the ICJ did on the sovereign immunity question. Both concepts 
seem to entail secondary rules or procedural elements in determining a hierarchy or 
choice between norms, as well as substantive elements. The court’s method of 
distinguishing and separating norms into their proper spheres through considering which 
questions they deal with (or which matters they address) is helpful, but as seen below, is 
not so straightforward in the matter of inter-temporality.  
 
Here, it is asked whether inter-temporality and the peremptory norm ask and answer the 
same question. At first glance, it appears that they obviously do not. Inter-temporality 
asks: which law should apply (secondary rules)? And the court in Jurisdictional 
Immunities appears to suggest that all that the jus cogens norm asks is whether an act is 
lawful (substantive rule). But as seen above, both these views are restrictive.  
 
The inter-temporal principle, as said above, involves a choice between substantive norms, 
one of which—in the present case—has the quality of non-derogability. Non-derogability 
of jus cogens is itself a choice of laws issue like inter-temporality, only that it provides an 
answer contrary to that provided by inter-temporality. A choice of laws of its very nature 
is presumptive of the existence of a direct contradiction, clear from the fact that the two 
norms or sets of laws are mutually exclusive, one necessarily giving way to the other, and 
it is this inherent contradiction that necessitates the choice between them in the first 
place.  
 
Indeed, where jus cogens is involved, the question must arise as to whether the very 
asking of the question asked by inter-temporal law (which law?) itself entails an 
immediate contradiction of the jus cogens norm. Put differently, asking “which law” 
between a jus cogens norm and another seems to be the very question that non-
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derogability attempts to exclude a priori. Essentially, non-derogability seems to give a 
direction to the tribunal that is contrary to the direction the tribunal receives from inter-
temporality: It says that whenever one is forced to ask “which law” applies between jus 
cogens and another norm, the answer is always jus cogens—which of course implies that 
inter-temporality always contradicts jus cogens. 
 
Moreover, in the case of state immunity, the court had indicated that the procedural 
question comes before the substantive determination166—so that the two avoid each other 
and never come into direct conflict. From the above, however, it seems that the dual 
nature of both principles, the status of jus cogens as superior to contrary laws and the 
nature of inter-temporality as a method of choosing between substantive norms makes 
that linear methodology unworkable. The solution ends up looking circular because the 
superiority of jus cogens seems to provide a ready answer to the question posed by inter-
temporal law (which law?) rendering inter-temporality meaningless wherever jus cogens 
is involved. 
 
b) Two norms leading to incompatible decisions 
 
A difference is apparent between international law as it stands at present and in the past: 
one contains an explicit, universally binding prohibition against torture that the other 
does not. Indeed, between Filartiga vs Pena- Irala (1980) and the law of the 1950s, as 
was reviewed in chapter one, this difference is clear. But does such a difference amount 
to a contradiction between two norms? Which two norms? And does it matter? Per 
conclusion 2 on fragmentation, conflict is based on the presence of two contrary norms. 
But such a “contradiction” as exists in general international law between 1950 and 1980 
may lie merely in the difference between the presence of a positive prohibition of certain 
conduct and its absence. But can mere absence of a rule count as a “contrary” norm, 
against which a peremptory norm must not be permitted to yield? How could mere 
absence be tested against the peremptory norm on torture as a contradiction, when this 
absence is in fact, no norm at all?  
                                                          




It is difficult to say whether there was a customary rule specifically authorizing use of 
torture by states in the 1950s and the time before. As reviewed in chapter one, modern 
international law in this area was only just developing. Given, however, that it was 
developing in the direction of a clear prohibition of torture, it is doubtful that such a 
custom, if present before the war, continued after it. What is clear is that there was no 
clear, positive, universally binding prohibition of torture immediately after the war. As 
seen above, the court seems to take it for granted that “contradiction” refers to a situation 
where a norm declares lawful what jus cogens renders unlawful or vice versa. Hence the 
need to find the contrary norm in the law of the early 1950s against which the peremptory 
prohibition of torture is compared. 
 
The ICJ in the Lotus case stated a general principle in international law by which states 
are permitted to do whatever is not explicitly prohibited by a rule of international law—
variously called the Lotus “rule”, “presumption” or “principle”.167 This decision is 
controversial and has been criticized by both scholars and ICJ judges for its implied 
support of an absolute state sovereignty.168 For the purposes of this discussion, however, 
and regardless of the truth of the principle, the fact remains that if a tribunal were to hold 
today that the Mau Mau tortures were lawful per the general international law of the early 
1950s, they would essentially be asserting the same principle as the Lotus. At the very 
least, therefore, there would be a contradiction between this Lotus principle that 
presumably permitted states to conduct torture in 1952 and early 1953, and the current 
peremptory norm prohibiting the same, both of which are on the table in the case of a 
tribunal hearing the matter today. 
 
On the other hand, regardless of the question of the identity of the norm actually 
responsible for the contrary result, the fact is that a judicial body applying the inter-
temporal principle in evaluating the legal status of acts of a distant past will generally 
“recognize as lawful”, acts that may otherwise be unlawful when judged through the law 
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prevailing at the time of the determination of the case and vice-versa: Should it matter 
whether there is an identifiable norm in direct contradiction—that is, a norm that more 
directly states that torture is permissible—if the results of the operation of whatever norm 
in the circumstances is a declaration that the very subject matter that the jus cogens norm 
prohibits is lawful? 
 
Indeed, conclusion 2 above refers only to “incompatible decisions” of two norms of 
international law. Certainly, inter-temporal law does not deal directly with any subject 
that any recognized peremptory norm deals with. It does not, for example, provide that 
torture is acceptable (in any era). This, however, is the direct result of its application. 
Thus, it fits the essence of conflict as explained—where the result of the application of a 
norm is incompatible with that of the application of another. It thus seems that it should 
not matter what kind of norm is responsible for the result, as long as the contradictory 
result is the product of the operation of a non-peremptory norm. Thus, if neither the 
absence of a rule, nor the Lotus presumption is adequate to serve as the second contrary 
norm required for a finding of a normative conflict in favor of jus cogens, inter-
temporality itself would surely qualify: its application leads to the same contrary result.  
 
Indeed, Lammasch’s position referenced in chapter two bears repeating: Where an 
international tribunal finds itself having to render a decision that at the time of the 
judgment seems positively opposed to the prevailing public morals, “for example, to 
recognize the slave-trade as an acceptable commercial practice”,169 the tribunal is 
authorized to abandon the principle leading to the unacceptable conclusion and to instead 




As seen above, a normative conflict can be demonstrated between inter-temporal law and 
a particular peremptory norm to the extent that the two norms by and large meet the two 
                                                          




sets of criteria discussed above: The ILC’s principles in its study on fragmentation and 
those extracted from the Jurisdictional Immunities case. This however is true only if the 
peremptory norm is relevant to the dispute in its own right, such that were it not for its 
displacement by inter-temporal law, its operation would be automatic.  
 
On the other hand, if peremptory norms are not applicable in themselves—if they began 
at an identifiable point of time after the acts, for example, and are prospective in nature 
only—then no automatic conflict can be presumed. The peremptory norm simply would 
not apply of its own nature, rather than because of displacement by an inferior norm. Its 
application to the said events would, as opined by the ILC, depend on the volition of the 
states and not arise from its peremptory nature. This is the issue of “validity and 
applicability” left for discussion in chapter four.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE WIDE TEMPORAL SPHERE OF JUS 
COGENS—ARGUMENTS FROM MORALITY 
 
In terms of the ILC criteria for normative conflict, “validity” means that the two norms 
“each cover the facts of which the situation consists,”171while applicability means having 
“binding force in respect to the legal subjects finding themselves in the relevant 
situation.”172 Thus, for a normative conflict to exist between jus cogens and inter-
temporality, jus cogens must be relevant to the particular dispute in question, in its own 
right, and on the basis of its own legal character, independently of the relations that may 
exist between itself and any other norm.  But therein lies the problem. Jus cogens is a 
largely ambiguous concept. Save for the three characteristics of non-derogability, 
universality and superiority of its norms, little else has been definitively or satisfactorily 
settled about the nature and scope of jus cogens. The question that the requirement of 
validity and applicability asks—whether jus cogens in its own right applies to the acts in 




Dinah Shelton has described as an “anachronistic analysis,” Haunani-Kay Trask’s claim 
that human rights enshrined in the UDHR were violated in 1893.173 Trask justifies his 
own argument thus, 
 
“We must all remember that the ideal of universal self-determination is a 
settled principle of peremptory international law, superseding customary rules 
and bilateral treaties. The principle of self-determination is of sufficient 
importance to be applied retroactively to relationships among states and 
peoples before the adoption of the 1948 United Nations Charter.”174 
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Indeed, in the approach followed in this paper thus far, it has seemed that the law has 
been made to work backwards. The arguments made seem to lead unavoidably to the 
criticism that a state is here being charged with having violated a non-existent 
international norm. But perhaps the problem lies in understanding “international law” too 
narrowly. As referenced earlier in chapter one, Shelton, for example, says: 
 
“A very few authors have tried to invoke the concept of jus cogens to give 
retroactive effect to certain norms.  However, this involves giving the concept 
of jus cogens itself retroactive effect, because its inclusion in the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties represented progressive development not 
codification of international law.”175    
 
For her, the very concept of jus cogens as a legal reality is a product of the VCLT (either 
in 1969 when it was adopted or in 1980 when it came into force). It did not exist as 
international law prior to it. Considering that the VCLT (the origin of the legal doctrine 
of jus cogens, per this view) is itself explicitly non-retroactive (articles 4 and 28), she 
considers that any attempt to associate peremptory norms with the past is inescapably 
anachronistic. But is it true that jus cogens had no legal validity prior to the VCLT?  
 
This chapter explores this question and more as it discusses the temporal scope of 
application of jus cogens in general, and of individual peremptory norms in particular. It 
is argued that peremptory norms, particularly those of a purely humanitarian character, 
enjoy or, at least should, enjoy a wide temporal scope of application in international law. 
 
I. The temporal origins of jus cogens in the VCLT 
 
Dorr & Schmalenbach’s conclusion on the effect of the VCLT (and its non-retroactivity) on 
peremptory norms is opposite to Shelton’s described above. For them, the development 
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introduced by the VCLT is the very idea that jus cogens lacks retroactive effect,176 which 
is the common interpretation of article 64 of the VCLT. That article provides, 
 
“If a new peremptory norm of general international law emerges, any existing 
treaty which is in conflict with that norm becomes void and terminates.” 
 
Hence, per Dorr & Schmalenbach, peremptory norms that existed prior to the coming 
into force of that convention (1980)—which most assuredly would include torture, 
considering that Filartiga was itself from the same year177—are not subject to the 
Convention’s notion (as commonly interpreted) in article 64.178 However, he leaves room 
for the possibility that the rule in article 64 may have been a codification of international 
law.  
 
But Magallona notes that the VCLT’s non-retroactivity would affect both article 53 
(which introduces the jus cogens concept to the regime of the VCLT) and article 64.179 
Thus, the “new peremptory norm” of article 53 would refer only to norms that emerge 
after the VCLT itself (or from 1980). He thus concludes that neither treaties nor 
peremptory norms that pre-existed the convention could be affected by article 64.180  In 
short, the VCLT principles do not govern the relationship between peremptory norms and 
contrary treaties for the entire period of international law that preceded the VCLT itself. 
Therefore, articles 53 and 64 did not represent a general principle, codification or even a 
clarification of the law, but established a new legal regime. 
 
But there is the problem, with this view, of the VCLT’s relationship to the older treaties 
and norms in the period after the VCLT had come into force. Article 64 provides that 
contrary treaties terminate at the point of emergence of a new peremptory norm. But the 
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view above does not accept that any norm was peremptory prior to the VCLT. Hence, it 
is clear that in 1980, when the convention came into force, the older treaties would be 
subject to article 64 which deals with them directly. But what about the individual 
peremptory norms? If the commonly recognized peremptory norms did not exist (at least 
not as peremptory norms) prior to the VCLT, when can they be taken to have come into 
existence so as to terminate the contrary treaties dealt with by article 64?  
 
Magallona argues that the older peremptory norms only became peremptory upon the 
application of article 53 to them. This could only have happened in 1980 when the 
Vienna Convention came into force. It is only at that time that these norms could be 
considered as “recognized by the international community as a whole” per article 53. 
Therefore, per this view, the law on genocide, slavery, jus in bello and jus ad bellum, all 
became “new peremptory norms” in 1980 by operation of the VCLT and were only 
ordinary norms of international law before then. 
 
It is hard to follow this logic, not only because of its complexity but because the VCLT 
itself does not recognize any particular peremptory norm. How then is it concluded that 
the said norms became peremptory upon the coming into force of the VCLT? It seems 
that this view implicitly acknowledges that prior to the VCLT, these older (now 
peremptory) norms indeed fit the formula of article 53 in that they were “recognized by 
the international community as a whole as norms from which no derogation is permitted.” 
The claim thus appears to be that this recognition only became legally significant once 
the jus cogens concept had been adopted and proclaimed in the VCLT. But if such norms 
were recognized “by the international community as a whole” as non-derogable, this fact 
must at least have had significance in customary or general international law—in which 
case, the VCLT could only codify and not create the legal doctrine of jus cogens. 
 
There is also the problem of non-member states to the Vienna Convention. From the 
VCLT-centered approach to jus cogens described above, it would seem that the VCLT’s 
provisions could not bind non-member states in any way even after 1980. But as 
Verdross argued in response to Schwarzenberger’s assertions of the same view, a 
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peremptory norm that is supposedly binding on treaty members inter se only, is no 
peremptory norm at all.181 
 
The solution that Magallona provides is that the VCLT introduced a “new legal order” in 
international law.182 But it is hard to distinguish this from an attempt to constitute VCLT 
member-states as a legislative body capable of binding all subjects of international law, 
whether they are members to the convention or not. This is unjustifiable, even—or 
especially—from a positivist approach which cannot abide any idea of one state 
exercising legislative authority over another without the other’s consent.  
 
Moreover, Verdross wrote in 1937,  
 
“every juridical order regulates the rational and moral coexistence of the 
members of a community. No juridical order can, therefore, admit treaties 
between juridical subjects, which are obviously in contradiction to the ethics 
of a certain community.”183 
 
Such treaties would be contra bona mores—“contrary to good morals.”184 According to 
Verdross, this principle was indisputably recognized in international law and part of the 
general principles of law recognized by civilized nations when he wrote his essay in 
1937. In that case, there would be no reason why articles 53 and other VCLT articles on 
peremptory norms should be viewed by Shelton and others as developments rather than 
codifications of the law. The implication of their view is that nothing that happened 
before 1980 matters as far as the legal ramifications for the characterization of a norm as 
jus cogens goes, but this does not seem properly justified.   
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It is clear from the above that the view that jus cogens is—legally-speaking—the product 
of the VCLT is at best controversial. If indeed the VCLT has authority regarding its 
provisions on peremptory norms, this authority must come from the content of the norms 
themselves, whose general form must be taken as only having been codified in the 
convention. The universal, binding authority of peremptory norms cannot be based on the 
group of states that acted in the VCLT formation and adoption, for these states simply 
have no authority in international law to bind other equally sovereign states. Hence, to 
claim that the VCLT virtually created jus cogens seems tantamount to denying the very 
concept of jus cogens.   
 
What the VCLT did should rather be seen as a final resolution on the jus cogens debate 
(by international consensus) in favor of the camp that had always argued for a place for 
jus cogens in international law against rigid positivism. Thus, the VCLT is hereafter 
treated only as a codification of the international law on peremptory norms and not its 
ultimate source or origin.  
 
What, then, is the relationship of jus cogens with time beyond the authority of the VCLT? 
More particularly, what is the temporal scope of individual peremptory norms—like the 
prohibition of torture, for example? 
 
II. Origins of peremptory norms beyond the VCLT: The role of morality 
 
In his essay mentioned above, Verdross went on to extrapolate from his explanation of an 
existing compelling law, a system by which the individual “essential” norms he referred 
to could be identified. His method was based on equality of states and what he called 
“tasks” of states, such that any norm is impermissible which purports to deny states this 
essential quality of equality or to prohibit in some form, the performance of a state’s 
tasks. In his own words,  
 
“the analysis of these decisions shows that everywhere such treaties are 
regarded as being contra bonos mores which restrict the liberty of one 
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contracting party in an excessive or unworthy manner or which endanger its 
most important rights.”185 
 
He starts from a premise of both essential rights (equality) as well as responsibility 
(tasks). These responsibilities, interestingly, have to do with a state’s relationship with its 
own people and not with the community of states. Regardless—and crucially—such 
responsibilities form the basis of the state’s relationship with other states in international 
law, by providing the limit beyond which other states cannot legally interfere with that 
state through treaties or custom. These state “tasks” and essential rules he derives from 
general principles of law recognized by civilized nations as it was defined in the Statute 
of the Permanent Court.186 Hence, Verdross already concluded before the beginning of 
the 2nd World War and the international order it introduced, that treaties would be null 
and void where they purported to: 
i) Bind a state to harm its citizens directly or to limit essential services to them such 
as the provision of hospitals, schools and other such essential services, or to 
otherwise subject its people to suffering. 
ii) For whatever purposes, limit a state’s capacity for its police or protective services 
to such levels that its population was exposed to anarchy and disorder. 
iii) Limit a state’s armed forces such that it was incapable of protecting its right to 
exist. 
iv) Limit a state’s capacity to protect its citizens abroad. However, this is limited 
where another state has taken over the duties, such as where the citizen is an alien 
in another state. 
 
His schema does not limit a state’s capacity to enter agreements that transfer the duty of 
performance of these tasks to other states, such as is the case in protected states.187 
Instead, it limits a state’s capacity to annihilate that “right” of performance of essential 
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tasks completely. Therefore, the tasks/duties themselves are indestructible. The state only 
has enough leeway to delegate them to another, but never to destroy them.  
 
It may be argued, however, that the tasks in his schema are not necessarily converted into 
duties that the state owes to other states. They are presented mainly as essential rights of 
each state that cannot be taken away through custom or treaty. Hence, a state has a right 
in international law to carry out certain tasks as regards its people, and such a right 
cannot be taken away through agreement or custom, except where another state takes 
over the same tasks.188 Yet, the very limitation placed on a state from exposing its 
citizenry to harm by consenting away its responsibilities shows that contrary to the 
rhetoric, international law was indeed concerned with the welfare of the subjects of states 
on a certain, basic level. In fact, it seems that Verdross identifies the very nature of a state 
with the performance of these essential tasks, such that any treaty purporting to take them 
away would do something akin to requiring an individual to commit suicide or murder his 
own children (by way of analogy) and thus constitute an unconscionable intrusion into 
the state, contrary to the basic morals of the community to which it belongs.189 
 
Indeed, the fact that the Nuremberg Charter included “crimes against humanity” covering 
atrocities carried out against German peoples is further proof that this very basic morality 
incumbent on states on this primary level was a presumption inherent to the 
understanding of international law among legal subjects of international law at that time.  
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Schwarzenberger, whose positivism goes further than anything discussed here so far, 
utterly denies that a concept such as jus cogens could possibly exist in “unorganized 
international society”.190 For him, such a concept could truly only exist in a body with an 
organ having capacity to impose rules and secure compliance thereof. This would be 
accomplished either through belief in some form of supernatural authority (what he calls 
the function of the “lawyer-priest”191) or through a truly centralized body headed by a 
powerful organ. He therefore says of such essential tasks as Verdross described above, 
that they constitute only minimum standards of civility. His solution to the,  fact that an 
absolutely positivist approach allows states, in principle, to contract the immoral treaties 
described in Verdross’s schema, is that states willing to enter such agreements would in 
so doing prove that they had sunk so far below recognized standards of civilization that 
they could no longer be counted as part of “civilized nations”.192 There would then be no 
reason for other states to treat such rogue or “outlaw” states193 as proper states.  
 
But this seems to concede that such standards are minimum requirements in international 
law—if indeed violating them should result in such serious consequences as stripping a 
state of any legitimacy or state-rights whatsoever, labeling it rogue and an outlaw vis-à-
vis the international community. For why should standards of civility matter at all if 
states are truly free to do whatever they will to do as long as prior engagements and pacta 
sunt servanda are given their due respect?  
 
In fact, Schwazenberger’s standards of civility are indistinguishable in their practical 
effects from jus cogens, for the loss of such state-rights would render the immoral 
agreements entered by these states dead on arrival as far as other states are concerned 
(thus, practically invalidating them). Indeed, Schwarzenegger’s position would seem to 
go even further in its consequences than  jus cogens requires, especially in view of the 
ICJ’s very limited view in its decision in the Jurisdictional Immunities case. His solution 
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also raises questions of whether other states would then have a right to use force against 
such an entity (outlaw) without violating any treaty or customary norms.  
 
In any case, the ILC in the commentary on the Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties 
before the adoption of the VCLT had rejected this strict positivist approach in matters of 
jus cogens. It  stated that the view that “there is no rule of international law from which 
States cannot at their own free will contract out has become increasingly difficult to 
sustain.”194 Indeed, Parker & Neylon note that the evidence in practice showed that states 
usually act under a general presumption that all law is jus dispositivum or positive law, 
until they run into an unjust law—at which point they seem to drop the assumption.195  
This may have happened with international law after the Nazi atrocities in World War II.  
 
In addition to Schwarzenberger’s treatment of “barbaric” treaties or his recognition of 
commonsensical “standards of civilization,” two things can be concluded from Parker & 
Neylon above: a) Jus cogens is highly exceptional—the general rule of international law 
is in fact, positive law. b) Jus cogens is, essentially, no more nor less than international 
morality and ethics. While indeed a legal concept, it nonetheless entails a moral judgment 
on values,196 hence the Special Rapporteur’s statement that peremptory norms “involve 
not only legal rules, but considerations of morals and international good order.”197 
 
State responses to “unjust laws” as described by Parker & Neylon and even 
Schwarzenberger above (though the latter only sees them as matters of common sense 
and not legality per se) cannot logically be presumed to be baseless. Such a response to 
the actions of other sovereign states must arise out of an already present set of 
commonly-held (possibly universal) beliefs that had simply been taken for granted 
without much conscious thought or need for explanation before their violation. They are 
                                                          
194 ILC (Draft Law on Treaties commentary) at 247, para 1. 
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196 Orakhelashvili at 48—50. 
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moral presumptions. It is only in this way that the notorious capacity of some jus cogens 
crimes to “shock the human conscience” makes sense.  
 
Indeed, the legal language used to describe some of the recognized peremptory norms 
seems clearly to invoke morality as the ground from which the norms stem. The common 
use of phrases such as the above-mentioned “crimes that shock the human conscience”, 
or “crimes against humanity” is moral language and the very concepts of “humanity” or 
“human conscience” are inseparable from morality. Jus cogens is thus a way by which 
international law makes basic morality legally significant. 
 
As fundamental morals of the international community, it would seem that peremptory 
norms cannot all be the product of simple state-will—even cumulative or collective state-
will. They defy the normal categories of law that find its roots in a clear expression of 
legislative authority (in international law terms, in state-consent) identifiable at specific 
points of time. Indeed, binding morals within clear temporal limits seems a difficult task. 
As argued below, it would rather be deemed that they co-exist with the interest they 
immediately protect, for peremptory norms are expressions of the fundamental interests 
of the community or indeed the species “as a whole” as these interests are communicated 
on a global, political platform of state relations.  
 
What then is to be made of the language of article 53 of the VCLT, which seems to imply 
that, to the contrary, these norms are in general, intentionally created and therefore 
capable of being placed within definite temporal bounds?  
 
III. Article 53 of the VCLT: The creation vs. identification debate 
 
According to the ILC, article 53 of the Vienna Convention presents “stringent” criteria 
for the identification of peremptory norms. This article requires that the norm in question 
fulfil two criteria: a) recognition as a norm of general international law, “binding as 
such”; and b) recognition as having a peremptory character (being non-derogable) by the 
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international community of  states as a whole.198 The ILC then lists the “relatively few 
peremptory norms” that meet the criteria (the prohibitions of aggression, genocide, 
slavery, racial discrimination, crimes against humanity and torture; and the right to self-
determination199). 
 
In the case of torture, both criteria above were met rather late. A principle against torture 
clearly existed in general terms immediately after the Second World War or this 
prohibition would not have found its way into the UDHR, 1949 Geneva Conventions, the 
ECHR or the UN Charter. But as seen earlier, the position of this principle was very weak 
from a positivist perspective. Of the four instruments, only the Charter (the least explicit 
about torture) was in force and binding for Great Britain at the relevant time. Therefore, 
at best, this principle was “soft law” in terms of the general international law of 1952 and 
early 1953. At that time, it was recognized neither as a norm of general international law 
“binding as such”, nor as peremptory. It would become a clear positive and explicitly-
binding rule of general international law after a few years had passed and states had had 
the opportunity to clearly express their opinio juris on the matter in the various ways 
recounted in Filartiga. 
 
According to the Lotus presumption mentioned earlier, only explicit expressions of state 
belief about the law count as international law. But, again, this principle is noted for its 
highly controversial nature. It appears to have been rejected by the ICJ in Nuclear 
Weapons, only to be relied upon again in Kosovo. Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and 
Buergenthal have said that the principle represents “the high water mark of laissez-faire 
in international relations and an era that has been significantly overtaken by other 
tendencies,”200 and Judge Simma remarked that it reflected legal reasoning “redolent of 
19th century positivism.”201 Hernández notes that while—as a matter of “judicial and 
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doctrinal policy”202—the Lotus principle has been in general rejected, it cannot be 
completely dismissed. Rather, it might be read as a rebuttable presumption in favour of 
national sovereignty as a residual principle.203 In any case, jus cogens must be seen as an 
exception to this proposition as it is not itself a part of jus dispositivum, the expression of 
which the Lotus principle is.  
 
As discussed above, there are certain ethics that exist in the background and without clear 
expression until they have been grossly violated and provoked a response in the field of 
international relations, which response comes in the form of new positive acts. Hence, 
Cassese and Lauterpacht both are of the view that even if the rules have not yet 
sufficiently crystallized or they remain unclear, they may still be “legally effective” 
because of their “moral and psychological weight.”204 Like all legal systems, 
international law is built on a certain ethical foundation, the nature of which is not always 
explicit, save only to the extent that it is based on a common humanity (formally, it was 
only a common “civilization”). What then is the effect of this late recognition of torture 
as peremptory in light of the ILC’s criteria above? 
 
The ILC’s explanation of article 53 in the VCLT seems to be of a process of 
identification. Identification is not creation—though the ILC does explain elsewhere that 
article 53 recognizes the possibility of creating peremptory norms and the special place of 
states in such a process as “par excellence the holders of normative authority on behalf of 
the international community.”205 Again, this only allows at most that some currently 
recognized peremptory norms may be products of such a process of creation, or it may 
simply refer to the possibility that a peremptory norm not yet in existence may be 
legitimately created in the future through the agency of the “international community of 
states as a whole.” What it does not require is the conclusion that all currently recognized 
peremptory norms have been created by such a process.  
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Indeed, according to the ILC itself, peremptory norms are not peremptory only by 
designation, but also because of their substantive content and their relationship with 
wider (and fundamental) interests of the international community. Thus, 
 
“A rule of international law may be superior to other rules on account of the 
importance of its content as well as the universal acceptance of its 
superiority.”206 
 
Similarly, peremptory norms, 
 
“prohibit what has come to be seen as intolerable because of the threat it 
presents to the survival of States and their peoples and the most basic human 
values.”207 
 
And to the international court, some principles 
 
“are fundamental to the respect of the human person and “elementary 
considerations of humanity’”208 
 
Therefore, something in these norms themselves, independently of the actions of even the 
international community, makes them peremptory. From this, it can be seen that there are 
two elements that affect the view on how and why—and therefore when—a particular 
peremptory norm can be said to form:  
 
a) A norm is or becomes peremptory because of its own nature as a protection or 
expression of fundamental interests and values. As such, there is no reason to presuppose 
a specific act of state creating it at a definite point in time. The norm could legitimately 
be presumed to have existed—and been “in force”—for as long as the corresponding 
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international (communitarian) interest that it protects can be said to have existed in 
international law.  
 
b) A norm is peremptory because it is designated such by the international community. 
Thus, it is possible that certain norms are deliberately created for important reasons while 
others necessarily exist as part of a community simply by their own nature. 
 
Alternatively, regarding the ILC’s interpretation of the VCLT’s article 53, either: a) an 
ordinary norm already having the first element (appropriate substantive content) becomes 
peremptory only after it has satisfied the criterion of universal recognition; or (b) the 
satisfaction of this latter criterion only serves to clarify the status of the norm (that it is 
peremptory and not ordinary) so that once clarified, it can then be treated as having been 
jus cogens right from its beginning.  
 
If the former, the norm—as a peremptory norm—will have effectively been created from 
the date of the universal recognition and cannot be “in force” on the critical date of the 
acts in question. But in the case of the latter, such recognition, while indeed having 
retroactive effects, would only be so in a limited, interpretive sense. It could not be 
construed as a simple application of a latter norm to events that pre-existed it 
(retroactivity). Rather, it would be seen as clarifying the proper legal character of an old 
principle and its proper relationship to relevant facts. Indeed, this is not much different 
from the approach taken in evolutionary interpretation of treaties.  
 
In the Jurisdictional Immunities case, both the parties took for granted (and the court 
accepted) that the violation of jus in bello during World War II were violations of jus 
cogens. Thus, they allowed today’s understanding that significant portions of IHL are of 
jus cogens status to affect the interpretation of treaty and customary norms from the 19th 
and early 20th century.  It would seem therefore, that the point in time at which a 
peremptory norm receives universal recognition is immaterial once such recognition has 




In addition, as Linderfalk notes, were article 53 to be taken as referring to a process by 
which the peremptory norm is created, it would be circular and illogical209 because article 
53 “assumes what remains to be established: the creation of jus cogens.”210 That is to say, 
for states to accept and recognize that a norm is non-derogable, the norm must indeed be 
so at the time of the said recognition. If it is not, the recognition that it is non-derogable 
cannot occur or would be wrong if it occurred. Such acceptance and recognition cannot 
therefore be the constitutive act that forms the peremptory norm. Rather, when states 
recognize that a norm cannot be derogated from, “they do so because according to their 
judgment, international law does not permit derogations from (it).”211 To call such an act 
creative is to take the position that the states are wrong in their judgment at the time they 
recognize the norm as a norm from which no derogation is permitted, as this approach 
necessarily presupposes the non-existence of the peremptory norm immediately prior to 
its “acceptance” as a norm from which no derogation is permitted.  
 
Linderfalk explains that because of this highly-criticized feature of article 53, it cannot be 
taken as describing a process by which a peremptory norm is actually created. Instead, 
the article makes sense only if it is understood as describing a process of identification. 
The creation process must be looked for elsewhere.  
 
Linderfalk argues that peremptory norms are created through the same murky process 
that creates customary international law. But again, the process he describes may very 
well be a process of mere identification—no more than the means by which “universal 
recognition” is achieved. Instead, and in light of the above discussion, it is argued in this 
paper that save for norms of jus ad bellum and other state-focused or sovereignty-
protecting norms, it is impossible to identify any point in time in which a norm that is 
now recognized as peremptory was formed, especially in the area of humanitarian 
peremptory norms, saturated as they are with moral-ethical or value-based content as 
described above. These latter norms must simply be accepted as having been part of 
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international law always, once they are identified as peremptory through the universal 
recognition process.  
 
As said earlier, the ILC explanation of peremptory norms using both content and a 
recognition process may also mean that there are some norms that are peremptory due 
only to their substance (content), though identified through recognition, and there are 
norms that are indeed created through such a process of universal recognition. Indeed, 
article 53 defines peremptory norms as those “which can be modified only by a 
subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.” This shows that 
at least some peremptory norms can come to an end or become derogable where a 
conflict exists between two peremptory norms. Such norms are therefore temporally 
limited in their application and it is not possible to treat them as having formed, even 
implicitly, a part of international law throughout.  Alternatively, article 53 might be 
interpreted as indicating that all peremptory norms, without exception, are essentially 
extinguishable by operation of a new peremptory norm. But as is argued below, this only 
makes sense with some peremptory norms, viewed in themselves and their role in 
international society, but not with all peremptory norms. 
 
Indeed, part of the problem with article 53 seems to be the use of blanket terms and lack 
of nuance. Essentially, even norms prohibiting genocide and slavery are theoretically 
displaceable by some future peremptory norm. But this disturbing implication is 
impossible to reconcile with modern international law as seen in Khan’s comment that 
peremptory norms may indeed be timeless and that the prohibition of genocide is not 
foreseeably changeable under article 53.212 He however does not accept this as true of all 
peremptory norms.213 The “never again”214 rhetoric that followed the atrocities of the 
2ndWorld War and continued long after and the language of the trial courts at Nuremberg 
and other comments referred to in chapter 2, similarly highlight the presumption 
underlying much current legal discussions that such acts as slavery and genocide could 
                                                          
212 Khan AK (2003) A Theory of Universal Democracy: Beyond the End of History, 
MartinusNijhoff Publishers, 87. 
213 Ibid. 
214 Alkalaj S ‘Never Again?’ (1999) 23 Fordham International Law Journal 357. 
65 
 
never again be seen as legitimate in the future of law. For example, it is present in Koffi 
Annan’s speech in which he explains that ensuring that genocide could never happen 
again was seen as the most important mission of the United Nations.215 These objects and 
“missions” of the international order cannot be reconciled with a reading of the VCLT 
that leaves the same law open to possible legal genocide. 
 
Neither is it foreseeable, also, how a peremptory norm such as the prohibition of 
genocide—the deliberate targeting of human groups and peoples for annihilation—could 
possibly come into conflict with an emergent future norm unless that emergent norm 
were the product of a radically different international order. Indeed, it would have to be 
an order built on values and principles directly opposed to those held as most 
unquestionable today.216 Such an “order” would be fundamentally different, not just in the 
organizational or structural sense, but in the very essential ethics from which the system 
stems.217 Indeed, in both Verdross’s and Schwarzenberger’s conflicting discussions on jus 
cogens above, an “order” such as this would not be a legal order at all, its membership 
consisting merely of outlaws or entities that are not essentially states (per Verdross’s 
“essential tasks”).  
 
Such a state of affairs has no relationship whatsoever with present international law or the 
principle in article 53. It is thus unreasonable to claim that this implosion of legal order 
could possibly be contemplated by article 53 or any instrument of the present system. It 
must be concluded, instead, that there is an irreducible minimum to the degree of change 
that is possible to the value system of the international community.  
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Indeed, the ILC’s implicit classification of peremptory norms in the reference to the 
various protected interests (“states, their peoples and basic human values”218) shows that 
peremptory norms, being one group, are not necessarily uniform. Verdross also groups 
peremptory rules “created” for a humanitarian purpose on one hand and those concerned 
with the use of force on the other. In his grouping for the “humanitarian” peremptory 
norms, he refers to the ICJ’s statement in its advisory opinion on genocide about 
instruments “adopted for a purely humanitarian or civilizing purpose.”219 There is no 
discussion on any difference in effects or reach of these norms among any of these 
authors’ works, but this paper argues that such distinctions are logical. 
 
For example, jus ad bellum seems a good candidate for such future modification as 
envisioned in article 53 of the VCLT, but only to a certain level. Concepts like “armed 
attack,”220 “self-defence,”221 “threats,”222 as well as the UN collective-security system,223 
are potentially subject to some modification depending on future security needs and the 
international political arrangement that may then exist. Such trends have already been 
noted with the emergence of transnational terrorism and its relationship to non-
international armed conflicts, especially in America’s war with transnational non-state 
actors in Afghanistan after the events of 9/11. It has been suggested that the law has 
changed224—though in what sense, it cannot as yet be fully ascertained.225 On the other 
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hand, self-determination—at least in its “external” manifestation—is even today 
subjected to the territorial integrity of extant states.226 But neither genocide, nor slavery, 
nor indeed torture is either subjected to other principles in any declaration or spoken of in 
terms that suggest their capacity for change or replacement as indicated possible in article 
53. 
 
It is the argument of this paper that, unlike jus ad bellum or even (external) self-
determination, the humanitarian peremptory norms, having as they do, the human being 
and human populations as their immediate object of protection, are distinct or should be 
distinguished from other norms of similar status, in their reach and effects.  
 
It is not that other peremptory norms, like jus ad bellum and external self-determination, 
are less fundamental. It is that they are tied to essentially changeable aspects of the 
international order, thus embodying more than the basic human values they are intended 
to secure.  The entire law of jus ad bellum, for example, is state-focused, not just in the 
sense that states have primary duties and rights as they do in all international laws, but in 
the sense that the immediate object of protection of these particular peremptory norms is 
the state itself or the highest political sovereignty. This is so even though the actual 
interests proximately secured by them are the higher values of “international peace and 
security”,227 and indeed, the very survival of civilization and of the human race.228 
Directly, however, the law governs inter-state relations at their most fundamental level, a 
level representing the necessary minimum principle—in the community’s judgment 
particularly following the lessons of the 2 World Wars—without which, states cannot 
peacefully co-exist.  
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Indeed it remains possible that the current political arrangement of international relations 
may undergo changes in this area, as noted above. For example, through increasing limits 
on the notion of sovereignty and possibly more centralization of the right to use force in 
international organs. Thus, it is possible that those higher or ultimate values now 
protected by the law of jus ad bellum may come to be protected through different laws in 
the future. However, it is not reasonable to conclude that these higher values 
themselves—peaceful co-existence and preventing unnecessary and widespread human 
suffering, for example—would themselves change. 
 
Like these higher values, the human being—individually or in groups—who is the 
immediate object of protection of the humanitarian peremptory norms is not subject to 
change. To assert that the peremptory norms that prohibit the human being’s direct injury 
are somehow capable of being set aside in future would therefore require asserting that 
the need to protect his existence at a basic level is itself subject to change. But as argued 
above from both Verdross and Schwarzenberger, a system with such a basis would not be 
recognizable as a legal order at all. If so, then because it is not foreseeable that these 
norms should ever cease to be part of a prospective international legal order, there is good 
reason to presume that they have been part of the international order in the past as well, at 
least implicitly, for they are not extricable from that legal order. 
 
Indeed, it might be argued that allowing peremptory norms to apply to the past carries the 
great risk of opening up a floodgate and causing a crisis in the present legal system. This 
was an argument often made in the years of the doctrinal debate regarding state immunity 
and jus cogens. In particular, there is the risk that it might spark claims based on all 
manner of historical grievances stretching back centuries. In the area of jus ad bellum and 
external self-determination, this might be particularly problematic as these norms are 
inextricably linked to numerous sovereign titles held by states today. However, as 
discussed above, there are good reasons for distinguishing the purely humanitarian 
peremptory norms from those that are concerned—at least directly—only with 






Neither the jus cogens concept nor individual peremptory norms are dependent on the 
VCLT for their temporal scope of application. In addition, individual peremptory norms 
of a purely humanitarian nature, of which torture is a part, cannot be placed in specific 
periods of the history of international law. This is owing: a) to their moral nature and b) 
to the phenomenon described by Parker & Neylon above, showing that jus cogens is 
more implicit than explicit until a gross violation forces positive acts by states. Thus, the 
prohibition of torture can be said to have been both “valid and applicable” to the events 
described in chapter one. This complements the discussion in chapter three and leads to 
the conclusion that a normative conflict is demonstrable between humanitarian 
peremptory norms and inter-temporal law as understood in positivist terms, such that the 
latter must yield to the former. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE LEGITIMACY OF APPLYING JUS COGENS 
TO THE PAST—ARGUMENTS FROM EVOLUTIONARY 
INTERPRETATION OF TREATIES AND THE THEORY OF 
COMMUNITY INTERESTS. 
 
I. “Evolutionary interpretation” 
 
Even granting—according to some of the arguments explored in chapter four—that 
peremptory norms are belated developments of international law, it would seem that the 
evolutionary interpretation of treaties is a phenomenon that belies any rigid approach to 
inter-temporality: that is, the attitude that regards international law’s relationship with 
past facts as frozen in time and static. The facts are indeed frozen in time, yet this does 
not mean that their interpretation and relationship with the law has to be. The facts 
remain what they are, but per the second “leg” of Max Huber’s doctrine, the court is 
permitted to give legal significance to developments of law that occur subsequent to the 
“juridical acts” of the first “leg” of the principle. Especially with human rights treaties, 
standards of the law contemporary with the dispute or its determination are routinely 
employed to interpret treaties in disputes that occurred before the development of these 
standards in general international law. As the advisory opinion in the Namibia case ruled, 
 
“an international instrument must be interpreted and applied within the overall 
framework of the juridical system in force at the time of interpretation”229 
 
This malleability of the law through time is expressed by Elias.230 He makes clear that the 
doctrine of inter-temporal law is one of the most important products of positivism in 
international law, ever since sovereignty became the cornerstone of international relations 
after the treaty of Westphalia. Therefore, inter-temporal law is an expression of the idea 
that the state is the source and guarantor of all law. With this background in mind and 
after an analysis of the Island of Palmas case, he finds that,  
 
                                                          
229 Namibia case at 16. 
230 Elias at 291. 
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“the doctrine of inter-temporal law would seem to have been based upon a 
view of international law as a dynamic legal system and not merely as a static 
interpretation of rules.”231 
 
More recently, Judge Al-Khasanweh has said of inter-temporality 
 
“we are not faced with a simple well-defined rule capable of automatic 
application, but rather with a perplexing idea that was incapable of finding a 
place in the 1969 Vienna Convention. Nor has the concept of inter-temporal 
law found support in judicial decisions, where it has been often overcome 
with the aid of a belated discovery of the intention of the parties as was the 
case in the Aegean Sea case, or by reading the provisions of modern law into 





“The concept of Inter-temporal Law, imaginatively updated and applied 
today, seems comprehensive enough as a doctrinal-legal category, to 
encompass modern evolutionary approaches to the interpretation of past 
history and their application through the judicial process,to the novation of old 
legal categories through the techniques of progressive, generic 
interpretation.”233 
 
As can be seen, a practice of applying law retrospectively and without the requirement of 
additional explicit approval of the parties is already in some way established in 
international law. Modern law is applied to treaties that were consented to in the past, in 
disputes arising from facts that occurred subsequently thereafter but before the 
                                                          
231 Ibid. 
232 Bakassi case at 502, para 15. 
233 Makarczyk J (1984) Essays in International Law in Honour of Judge Manfred Lachs BRILL 
MartinusNijhoff Publishers, at 199. 
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development of general international law in its modern form. The parties could not 
possibly have given prior consent to them. If treaty terms—wherein state intent is so 
much clearer in comparison to other expressions of state-consent—are capable of such 
reinterpretation through the eyes of modern norms and without there being a need for 
fresh expressions of state consent, why should it be presumed that customary 
international law and general principles that have since developed into peremptory norms 
should not be equally flexible? There is no good reason to assume so. 
 
Moreover, peremptory norms impose themselves on all states without regard to their 
agreement. Even a persistent objector would not be exempt. Therefore, a justification for 
a strict application of inter-temporality in the law of state responsibility (for violations of 
peremptory norms) that highlights the lack of consent on the state concerned is 
unsupportable. For in that regard, the position of the state in the past and in the present 
vis-à-vis the peremptory norm remains unchanged—in neither case is its consent 
required. Indeed, the only substantial difference between the two might be that of notice.  
 
Thus, it might be argued that Great Britain in 1952 had no notice that committing the acts 
described in chapter one was contrary to international law in general and to a peremptory 
norm of international law in particular, whereas the Britain of today is clearly well-
informed regarding its international responsibilities. This is the view that regards inter-
temporality from the perspective of the subject of law, and is all about justice. It relies on 
the idea that the acts in question were “innocently” committed. This leads to a discussion 
on the different perspectives or interests involved in such a dispute. 
 
II. A matter of competing interests 
 
When a tribunal applies inter-temporal law, it places itself in the place of a tribunal of the 
past and essentially asks itself what the past courts would have decided had they had an 
opportunity to examine the matter in their own time. The question that has been asked in 
this paper so far is whether a tribunal with the benefit of the knowledge of clearly 
enunciated fundamental values of contemporary international society, can afford to set 
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this knowledge aside and assume the ignorance of the hypothetically prior court, and 
whether it can do so without betraying these now-clear, fundamental values. Thus, such 
examination has been done from the point of view of the tribunal dealing with a case in 
the present context of basic values and legal principles held fundamental in the current 
legal community. It involves also the point of view of the present international 
community which cannot afford—through the tribunal—to make declarations that 
contradict its sacred values. Thus, the discussion has generally assumed the 
“communitarian interests” perspective, and is the view expressed by Lammasch and 
seems to have been that of the Inter-American Court in the Aloeboetoe case and Judge 
Tanaka in South West Africa. In short, it is the “community of values”234 approach that 
has prevailed in this paper thus far.  
 
In the “community of values” approach, the Court’s solution would involve weighing the 
ultimate interests of the community that are implicated and not simply opting for a 
uniform approach across the board. As Judges Khasanweh and Tanaka’s views discussed 
in chapter two show, inter-temporality protects all kinds of interests—from the very 
important to the relatively trivial and even the positively unconscionable. They cannot all 
be treated equally by a rigid application of the principle of inter-temporal law, especially 
where the community as a whole has a competing interest in the form of a protected 
human value.  
 
As was seen in chapter three, a normative conflict can be demonstrated—to an extent—at 
that point in time that a tribunal rules on a past act that contradicts presently recognized 
peremptory norms. From the community interests perspective, the onus is on the party 
arguing for the setting aside of a peremptory norm to demonstrate an equally important 
community interest that justifies such an action. This is, as explained by Hernández, the 
principle of par in par imperium non habet—that is, resolving conflict between principles 
                                                          
234 De Waart PJIM, Denters EMG &Schrijver N (1998) Reflections on International Law from the 
Low Countries: In Honour of Paul De Waart, MartinusNijhoff Publishers, 463. “Community of 
values” are presented as “universal or quasi-universal values” 
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using “a balancing test, taking into consideration the proportionality and legitimacy of the 
purpose”235 of the two.  
 
Such interests include, for example, the stability of current sovereign titles and the need 
for maintenance of peaceful co-existence through the security of borders and titles, 
coupled with the changing law of jus ad bellum. This may justify setting aside jus ad 
bellum and external self-determination. However, nothing can justify the same for purely 
humanitarian peremptory norms. In other words, no threats to vital interests of present 
international community “as a whole” are endangered by application of the latter norms 
to past events. 
 
But, as seen above, the “community interests” perspective is certainly not the only 
perspective through which this matter can be legitimately examined. There are also:  
 
a) The perspective of the subject of law described briefly above with reference to 
“notice” of the law: a question of justice. However, regarding the Mau Mau position, 
Britain could hardly be said to be innocent regarding its knowledge of the grave 
immorality of the acts involved. This is so considering the point of time in history in 
which these acts were committed. In its own legal system, Britain had long banned use of 
torture236 and had signed onto (though not yet become bound by) international (and one 
regional) instruments that prohibited torture. In any case, there could hardly be any 
injustice involved in repairing harm actually done by the state in question, merely 
because positive law was not clear at the time about international law banning the same 
acts that Britain considered illegal within its own territory. Moreover, the common law 
principle of strict liability237 shows that it is sometimes necessary and perfectly 
appropriate to hold a subject of law responsible for a wrong committed without his 
appreciation of its illegality. 
 
                                                          
235 Hernández (Reluctant Guardian) at 44. 
236 Rudolp H (1984) Security, Terrorism, and Torture: Detainees' Rights in South Africa and 
Israel: a Comparative Study, Juta & Co, 170—182. 
237 “Liability without fault”; Black’s Law Dictionary, 7th Ed, at 926. 
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b) The perspective of the legislature: This is in international law terms, from the point of 
view of the state as a source of law, and it involves a discussion of the conception of 
international law in general. In this case, positivism is the protected interest. As argued 
above, jus cogens simply cannot be made subject to positivism in any strict or absolute 
sense.  
 
c) The factual/historical view-point that examines the matter as an issue of fact—the law 
as it was. This does not concern itself with the interests of either the present international 
community or individuals and states, but assumes a somewhat detached position. 
However, bearing in mind that the “historical fact” under examination is the law, the 
question “what is law” is implicated in the first place, which was largely the discussion in 
chapter four. 
 
In fact, rigid application of only the first “leg” of Max Huber’s principle is the common 
practice among many writers. Such a perspective involves a combination of the two latter 
view-points explained above: state consent and objective historical fact. It is assumed that 
having jus cogens trump inter-temporality is circular (and anachronistic) because time in 
the human experience is linear and unidirectional. The past remains static, and “states 
cannot go back in time to bring their actions into conformity with the norm.”238 
Therefore, when a law seems to say that the past was other than it was (when viewed 
from the present), or when it has people and states “violating” non-existent international 
laws, it pits itself against reality and is vulnerable to the charge that it is illogical.  
 
However, it seems that to arrive at the conclusion that such is the case whenever inter-
temporal law fails to be applied to the past in the area of state responsibility, one would 
already be presuming : a) That a finding of responsibility necessarily involves making a 
factual statement about the opinio juris of the state concerned at the time of the event—or 
indeed of the opinio juris of other states at that time; b) That only clearly stated positive 
rules of custom and treaty count as part of international law which, again, was disposed 
of in chapter four. 
                                                          




However, exactly what meaning is given to a finding of responsibility depends on the 
perspective one takes. The tribunal need not be saying, “State x violated the 1980 
Convention in 1952;” nor need it say, “State x violated in 1952 the custom that developed 
and crystallized in the 1960s.” Instead, the court may simply be recognizing that certain 
past immoral actions of a particular gravity (recognized as gravely immoral, quite often, 
in both their own historical context and when viewed through the prism of present values) 
are worthy of legal redress and reparation in accordance with today’s positive rules and 
yesterday’s unmistakable moral values. In other words, the finding gives legal effect to 
certain moral principles already recognized in the past. This may appear extra-legal, but it 
accords to the very nature of jus cogens, discussed in chapter four, a term which itself is 
described as “extra-legal”.239 In other words, such a finding may simply be a statement 
that some old moral principles are part of international law, the lack of state consent in 
their regard notwithstanding. There is no reason to think this illogical. 
 
Ultimately, the different perspectives present different priorities and interests whose 
protection (by law) is sought. Any argument made presuming either one stems directly 
from the author’s own conception of international law. Indeed, as is argued above under 
“evolutionary interpretation”, inter-temporality itself, understood in its full significance 
(including its “second leg” as explained by Max Huber), is simply a process of weighing 
the different interests involved, particularly the need for the stability of the law against 
the need for the development of the law. Indeed, Judge Al-Khasanweh’s above-
referenced description of inter-temporality as a “perplexing idea” and not “a simple, well-
defined rule capable of automatic application”—especially regarding humanitarian 
peremptory norms—aptly captures this reality. 
                                                          
239 Hernández at 25—26, “The extra-legal dimension of peremptory norms”. 
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION 
 
The superiority of jus cogens in international law should be reflected in the application of 
the inter-temporal principle, as indeed it should in the application of all other inferior 
norms and principles wherever relevant subject matter is in issue. Indeed, an apparent 
normative conflict between jus cogens and inter-temporal law has been demonstrated 
using: a) the principles for the resolution of normative conflicts laid forth in the 
conclusions of the ILC work study on the problem of fragmentation in international law; 
and b) the principles applied in the Jurisdictional Immunities case. However, a normative 
conflict cannot be definitively concluded without establishing, independently, the 
temporal scope of jus cogens norms over the acts in question: if jus cogens norms begin 
at an identifiable point in time and are prospective in nature, no over-lap and thus no 
contradiction can be spoken of.  
 
The discussion therefore looked at the question of the origins of the jus cogens concept 
and norms in basic human morality, beyond temporally identifiable state acts. The charge 
of anachronism was answered in several ways.  
 
a) Firstly, it assumes that all jus cogens norms (and the concept itself) is based on state 
authority and ignores the nature of the concept as basic morality—a fact that limits the 
extent to which the existence of individual peremptory norms is directly attributable to 
temporally-identifiable acts of states. In this regard, the difficulties of the definition in 
article 53 of the Vienna Convention were discussed. While the article allows some room 
for the idea of a deliberate creation of peremptory norms, the nature of humanitarian 
peremptory norms is such that they cannot be presumed to be either limited in time or 
capable of being replaced in the future. Instead, the recognizing acts of the community of 
states must be regarded as no more than an identification process. Once such a norm is 
identified, it must not then be treated as if it was ever other than a peremptory norm.  
 
b) Even if a humanitarian peremptory norm can be said to be created by a temporally 
identifiable act of a group of states (even the “international community as a whole”), it 
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has been seen that there is no threat to justice, law, or truth in applying humanitarian 
peremptory norms in the area of state responsibility. While this claim of compatibility 
with objective “truth” may be challenged, such a challenge would presume only one view 
of a judicial finding of responsibility. But as argued in chapter five, the court need not 
state factual errors in order to uphold presently recognized norms, and the analogy of the 
common law principle of strict liability illustrates this. 
 
While the Mau Mau claims have been partly settled, and will likely remain within British 
municipal law, there is a small chance that similar cases may wind up before an 
international tribunal—either the European Court (in which temporal jurisdiction of the 
court itself and the territorial scope of the ECHR present a challenge) or the International 
Court, should states take up the cause on behalf of the victims. In the likely event that 
contemporaneous positive law offers little foundation for a legal claim, it is a worthy 
endeavour to re-examine the role of jus cogens in such suits, should they ever need to be 
determined on the basis of substantive international law. It has been the argument of this 
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